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The start of accession talks between Turkey and the EU on 3 October 2005 has forced 
Europeans to reconsider the European integration project. Debates over whether Turkey 
could ever be European have sharply increased in number. Prior to this stage, political, 
legal and economic aspects of the European integration project were more at the fore 
front. It is at this point, cultural considerations appear to underestimate the potential 
benefits of Turkey’s membership to the EU. Theoretically, rational institutionalism and 
sociologic/constructivist institutionalism are found to be partially competing and 
partially complementary. In other words, Turkey’s accession to the EU will be 
determined by its material costs/benefits; however, the perceptions of these costs will 
largely be determined by the willingness of the European public to accept Turkey. 
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Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği Üyeliği,  rasyonel kurumculuk, 




3 Ekim 2005’te Türkiye ile Avrupa Birliği arasında katılım müzarekelerinin başlaması 
Avrupalıları, Avrupa entegrasyon projesini gözden geçirmeye zorladı. Türkiye bir gün 
Avrupalı olabilecek mi türünden tartışmalar sayıca hızla arttı. Bu aşamaya dek, Avrupa 
entegrasyon projesinin daha çok siyasal, yasal, ve ekonomik  boyutları ön plandaydı. 
Tam bu bağlamda, kültürel etmenler Türkiye’nin AB’ye olası katkılarını  
gölgelemektedir. Teorik olarak, rasyonel kurumculuk ve sosyolojik/yapısalcı 
kurumculuk kısmen rekabetçi, kısmen tamamlayıcı bulundu. Diğer bir ifadeyle, 
Türkiye’nin AB üyeliği, Türkiye’nin materyal fayda/maliyet durumuna göre 
belirlenecektir. Bununla beraber, maliyetlerin algılanışı büyük çoğunlukta Avrupa 
kamuoyunun Türkiye’yi kabul etme arzusuna göre şekil alacaktır.  Bundan dolayı,  bu 
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Since the very day of its commencement in 1957, the European Union has 
completed five rounds of enlargement. The most recent enlargement has taken place in 
May 2004. Precise implications of the latest EU expansion (i.e. the EU’s Eastern 
enlargement) are not yet known. Therefore, the challenge of Eastern enlargement has 
paved the way for new theoretical explorations in the field of EU integration. Current 
literature revolves around the two main of institutionalism of different sort: (i) rational 
institutionalism, (ii) sociological/constructivist institutionalism. When framed as such, 
as also acknowledged by the most prominent scholars of the EU integration, the Eastern 
enlargement constitutes a theoretical puzzle. In view of the theoretical and empirical 
evidences as regards to the EU enlargement, it is thus possible to conceptualize the 
EU’s Eastern enlargement as a theoretical puzzle. Drawing from this, two logics of 
integration are argued to work behind the Eastern enlargement of the EU. Inevitably, 
logic of consequentiality and logic of appropriateness are also the ones which operate 
behind the two branches of institutionalism. Logic of consequentiality reveals the basic 
idea at work behind the rational institutionalism. Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal 
intergovernmentalism is identified with the rational institutionalism. In other words, 
theorizing the EU’s Eastern enlargement from the Moravcsik’s point of view is 
tantamount to put ‘utility-maximizing considerations’ in context. Here material 
considerations (economic, security, and political levels) are argued to be the driving 
engine of the EU enlargement policy. In other words, size and allocation of enlargement 
costs are assumed to be fundamentally decisive in the rational institutionalist 
explanation of the EU’s Eastern enlargement. 
On the opposite side of the debate, in the sociological/constructivist 
institutionalism, EU’s constitutive norms, principles and collective identity are 
considered to constitute the basics of the EU enlargement policy. Two complementary 
visions in the sociological/constructivist institutionalism are presented so as to provide 
insights into the logic of appropriateness: (i) Schimmelfennig proposes a novel 
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mechanism by means of which constitutive norms and principles have impacted on the 
social actors as regards to enlargement. This intervening variable is called ‘rhetorical 
action’. (ii) Helene Sjursen likewise emphasizes the importance of constitutive norms 
and principles of the EU in shaping the EU’s enlargement policy. However, Sjursen 
prefers to make use of ‘communicative action’ of Habermas as opposed to rhetorical 
action of Schimmelfennig. Drawing from the prioritizations done in the EU’s Eastern 
enlargement, Sjursen points out the salience of collective identity arguments in shaping 
the EU’s enlargement policy. Kinship-based arguments, according to Sjursen, have 
played a major role in the admittance of the CEECs in the latest enlargement round in 
May 2004. 
Nonetheless, both approaches are found to be partially competing and partially 
complementary. While rational institutionalism is argued to have a stronger explanatory 
power in clarifying the EU’s signing of Association Agreements with the CEECs; it 
fails in explaining the EU’s decision to go beyond the association partnership. Taken 
together the EU’s shared identity, its constitutive norms and principles along with the 
material considerations; the Eastern enlargement of the EU has been explained. In other 
words, sociological/constructivist institutionalism is argued to complement the rational 
institutionalism. 
When framed as such, what is significant and fruitful is to put Turkey’s EU 
membership into theoretical framework. While there is a bulk of literature as regards to 
the EU’s Eastern enlargement, there are a few academic works in which Turkey’s EU 
membership has been put into context. It is an interesting phenomenon in view of the 
fact that Turkey became an associate member to the EC/EU in 1963. There must have 
been a much more rigorous and systematic effort to theorize the Turkish case in relation 
to the EU. In December 2004, after 41 years of waiting at the doorstep of Europe, the 
EU decided to open accession talks with Turkey. Eventually, the accession talks started 
on 3 October 2005. This was a turning point in the history of Turkey-EU relations. For 
many Turks, this was a long-desired affirmation of Turkey’s European bid, a project 
whose roots date back to the beginning of the Turkish Republic. However, eventual 
membership in the EU is not yet assured. 
 In order to shed light on Turkey’s EU membership and discover possible 
implications of these theoretical approaches on the Turkish case, both the material and 
cultural/ideational factors are taken into consideration. However, institutional 
implications are not in the confines of the study. In addition, this thesis is not designed 
 3 
so as to test all approaches against one another. Central aim is to highlight the need to 
let other visions to provide new insights into the theoretical exploration of the EU 
integration. 
With this aim in mind, chapter one is designed so as to provide the theoretical 
framework of the thesis. Chapter two provides the historical and empirical analysis of 
Turkey-EU relations. In chapter three, likely impacts of Turkey’s EU membership are 
examined. This is done through the examination of utilitarian considerations: (i) 
geopolitical/ strategic considerations; (ii) economic considerations. For a number of 
reasons, Turkey’s aspiration to become a member of the EU has not been perceived by 
the EU as in the same fashion as other applications. Instead, Turkish case has been 
viewed as being ‘especially unique’ and ‘distinguishably problematical’. Therefore, 
cultural and ideational dimension of the debate over Turkey’s EU membership are 
examined in chapter four. Respectively, (i) European identity; (ii) Turkey as Europe’s 
other and the EU public opinion over the question of Turkey’s EU membership are 
presented. 
In sum, this thesis has concentrated on Turkey’s EU membership through 
adopting a critical approach to the existing theories of EU enlargement. In light of these 
theories, Turkey’s membership has been found to be qualitatively different and timely 
problematic when compared with the previous EU enlargements. In addition, it has also 
assessed Turkey’s potential contribution to the EU. Meanwhile, it has adopted a critical 
approach to the existing theories of EU enlargement and highlighted the shortcomings 





























Since the day of its foundation with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the European 
Economic Community has evolved in such a rapid fashion; now, it is rather hard to 
imagine what the future path will be for the European Union. In 1957, it started with the 
collaboration of a few group of countries which are later labeled as ‘the original Six’. 
Since then many successive rounds of enlargement have been observed in the history of 
the enlargement of the EU. The latest example of one of those enlargement rounds is the 
acceptance of ten new member states into the Union in May 2004.  
After the latest 2004 EU enlargement, the EU has grown from fifteen to twenty five 
members. Still other applicants are at the door of the EU and waiting for to get the 
‘seemingly privileged honor’ of being a full member of the EU. In other words, the EU 
is still in the process of creating itself and the very mechanism to do so is the 
enlargement. Therefore, enlargement is still important for the EU itself and apparently it 
will continue to be as such for the following years. Put it simply, the process has not yet 
ended and we still do not know how the enlargement mechanisms work and how the 
impacts of the successive enlargements has impacted (i) the way EU functions, (ii) the 
EU itself and (iii) the once-called ‘applicant’ but now ‘the new member’ states per se as 
well.  Though it is impossible to get the full understanding of the EU without a close 
investigation of each and every of the specific issue areas within the EU, it is still 
possible to get a rough but satisfactory understanding of the EU through a close 
examination of EU enlargement.   But what is at stake here is that the studies held in the 
field of European integration theory in general and EU enlargement in particular seems 
to be concentrating in the specific peripheral locations.1  
                                                
1
 For a deeper understanding of these concerns associated with the study of European 
integration and its concentration in peripheral locations see Schmitter, P., and J.I. 
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Despite the existence of myriad complaints about the study of EU enlargement, “a 
thorough and systematic investigation of how the EU has handled “the question of 
enlargement (across time, across different countries or regions and with regard to 
different policy areas)” is still tempting in terms of “providing valuable insights into the 
EU’s self-understanding, goals and priorities.” 2 
In order to put the Turkish accession to the EU in theory and context, the latest 
Eastern enlargement of the EU is chosen to be as the basic theoretical reference point of 
this study. Despite the existence of various scholars of different minds, traditions, and 
perspectives within the field of European integration theory; for the sake of brevity, 
three approaches will be held in the theoretical analysis part of the study. In the first 
section, enlargement will be examined through the lenses of liberal 
intergovernmentalism which is assumed to be one of the most promising representatives 
of the rational account in the study of European integration. In the remaining sections of 
the study, two other complementary approaches, which heavily draw from the 
sociological and/or constructivist account, will be investigated with the aim of 
understanding the study of EU enlargement. Two logics of integration are examined in 
this study: the logic of consequentiality and the logic of appropriateness. Liberal 
intergovernmentalism in the study is represented with the logic of consequentiality 
whereas sociological and/or constructivist approaches of Schimmelfennig and Sjursen 
are represented with the logic of appropriateness. 
To say the last but not the least, the structure of this part of the study is not 
designed so as to test all these approaches against one another but to emphasize the need 
to let other perspectives provide new insights into the theoretical exploration of 





                                                                                                                                          
Torreblanca, “Eastern Enlargement and the Transformation of the European Union”, in 
W. Loth and W. Wessels (eds.), Theorien Europaischer Integration, (Opladen: Lekse-
Budrich, 2001), pp. 219-46 and Wallace, H., “EU Enlargement: A Neglected Subject”, 
in M. Green Cowles and M. Smith (eds.), The State of European Union, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 149-63.   
              
2
 Sjursen, H., “Enlargement in Perspective”, ARENA Report: Proceedings from the 
CIDEL Workshop in Avila, Spain, on Justifying Enlargement- Past and Present 









1.1.1. The logic of consequentiality  
 
 
In order to understand the basic premises of the liberal intergovernmentalism, 
thorough understanding of the logic behind its premises is crucial. Having previously 
said that different metatheoretical approaches exist within the field; and, three 
approaches would be examined throughout the study so as to depict the dynamics of 
European integration in general and enlargement in particular; it is wise to remind that 
all three approaches held in this study eventually highlight the different aspects of the 
study of EU enlargement. In other words, multi-faces of the study of EU enlargement 
inescapably bring different logics of integration along. As Piedrafita and Torreblanca 
argue “each of them emphasizes a different logic as accounting for a certain political 
action or policy, a distinctive mode of social action and interaction, and a particular 
consideration of the nature and goals of the actors”.3 Hence, understanding of the 
different logics of integration (i.e. the logic of consequentiality and the logic of 
appropriateness) is necessary and highly important. Accordingly, this part of the study 
aims to examine the logic of consequentiality in order to explain the basics of the liberal 
intergovernmentalism of the rationalist account in the field of EU integration.  
According to schools in rationalist camp such as neo-realism and liberalism, 
actors’ decisions are on prima facie led by logic of consequentiality.4  That is to say, 
states, which are the primary actors, first “define their preferences about the different 
options with reference to their particular interests, and act according to them in a 
                                                
3
 Piedrafita, S., and Torreblanca, J. I., “The Three Logics of EU Enlargement: Interests, 




 For further information see March, J., and Olsen, J., “The Institutional Dynamics of 




basically technical environment”5, in which “bargaining is the common procedure to 
resolve disputes.”6 Hence when actors act according to their particular interest and 
engage in interaction for the betterment of their current position, actors are assumed to 
be ‘rational’. Needless to say, distribution of power, individual preferences and 
negotiating capabilities of the engaging actors determine the final outcome of the 
interactions pursued by the rational players. As Piedrafita and Torreblanca point out  
 
   “[a]s far as the EU is concerned, the relevant actors are considered 
to be the member states’ governments, who base their respective 
positions on the expected consequences of a specific political action, 
defining their preferences before the decision-making process sets off 
and, thenceforward, acting in a strategic way in order to maximize 
their gains.” 7 
 
 
1.1.2. Incorporation of domestic politics into the analysis of European integration 
and two-level games 
 
 
It is a well-known fact that neoliberals- when compared with realist school- tend 
to be more interested in the interaction of state preferences rather than in the distribution 
of capabilities among states.8 Hence neoliberals are both interested in the formation of 
state preferences and in the bargaining process occurring between the actors. Due to its 
special emphasis on formation of state preferences, liberal theory has to inescapably 
deal with the processes of domestic politics. 
                                                
5
 Scott, W.R., “Unpacking Institutional Arguments”, in W.W. Powel and P.J. 
DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organization Analysis, (Chicago: Chicago 




 Elster, J. “Arguing and Bargaining in the Federal Convention and the Assembleé 
Constituante”, in (eds.) R. Malnes and A. Underdal, Rationality and Institutions, (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1992); and, Schimmelfennig, F., “Strategic Action in a Community 
Environment: The Decision to Enlarge the European Union to the East”, Comparative 
Political Studies, Vol. 36, No.1/2, 2003, pp.156-83, as quoted in Piedrafita and 






 Stone, A., “What is a Supranational Politics? An Essay in International Relations 
Theory”, Review of Politics, Vol. 56, No. 3 (1994), p. 460. 
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In one of the earliest efforts of putting domestic forces into the analysis of the EC 
policy making, Simon Bulmer argued that the key players were the national 
governments and; therefore, the dynamics of integration basically were brought forth 
from the interactions of national state preferences in the EC.9 He extended his analysis 
and further claimed that to grasp the dynamics of the bargaining process taking place 
between national governments at the Community level, the domestic roots of state 
preferences which were negotiated in those bargains had to be taken into account while 
making assessments associated with the integration process. In the final analysis 
reached by Bulmer, domestic factors were considered to be the sources of legitimacy for 
state actors. 
Another work related with the incorporation of domestic factors into the 
exploration and study of the international relations is Putnam’s prominent idea of two-
level games. A ‘two-level game’ is a metaphor created to illustrate the linkages between 
domestic factors and international factors in studying international relations.10 Putnam 
basically claims that national executives (i.e. the heads of national governments which 
represent state preferences in the international arena) play games in two spheres almost 
simultaneously. At the domestic level, power-maximizer office holders’ endeavor to 
construct coalitions of support among domestic groups. At the international arena, the 
same players seek to find the best possible outcome in the bargaining process that 
would satisfy their domestic audiences. By acting as such, they would have the 
opportunity to enhance their positions at the domestic level. When viewed from a wider 
perspective, it is wise to claim that Putnam’s analysis has close resemblance to that of 
Bulmer’s. At this point, it is relevant and helpful to examine Andrew Moravcsik’s 
liberal intergovernmentalist analysis as the most recent example of theorizing European 






                                                
9
 Bulmer, S. J., “Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-Making”, Journal 
of Common Market Studies, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1983). 
 
10
 Putnam, R. D., “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, 





1.1.3. The logic of liberal intergovernmentalism 
 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism, which is almost always identified with Andrew 
Moravcsik, is an end result of a combination of two theories which are frequently 
regarded as being seemingly incompatible: liberal theory of International Relations and 
theory of intergovernmental institutionalism. By and large, liberal intergovernmentalism 
is simultaneously uttered with the task of theorizing of EU integration. According to 
Moravcsik 
   “[f]rom the signing of the Treaty of Rome to the making of 
Maastricht, the EC has developed through a serious of celebrated 
intergovernmental bargains, each of which set the agenda for an 
intervening period of consolidation. The most fundamental task facing 
a theoretical account of European integration is to explain these 
bargains.”11  
 
Throughout his analysis of the EC in his seminal article in 1993 he claims that 
“the EC can be analyzed as a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage 
economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination”.12 As already 
mentioned, his work can be regarded as an effort to incorporate domestic factors in 
examination of the international relations. In his work, there is a sharp emphasis on the 
formation of state preferences which are represented in the Community level as mere 
reflections of the domestic demands. Therefore, theorizing EU integration necessitates 
special emphasis on the formation of state preferences as well as the intergovernmental 
bargains taking place between the states at the international level. Accordingly, he 
arrives at this generalization about the state of the integration. 
   “such theories rest on the assumption that state behavior reflects 
that rational actions of governments constrained at home by domestic 
societal pressures and abroad by their strategic environment. An 
understanding of the preferences and power of its member states is a 
logical point for analysis”. 13  
                                                
11
 Moravcsik, A., “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No.4 
(December 1993), p. 473.   
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By doing so, he basically attempts to reach the conclusion that “although the 
EC is a unique institution, it does not require a sui generis theory”.14 To construct 
such a framework which he prefers to label as ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’, he 
utilizes his earlier work associated with the analysis of the origins of the SEA.15 
According to Moravcsik, “Liberal intergovernmentalism builds on an earlier 
approach, ‘intergovernmental institutionalism’, by refining its theory of interstate 
bargaining and institutional compliance, and by adding an explicit theory of 
national preference formation grounded in liberal theories of international 
interdependence”.16 Moravcsik proposes three elements which stand at the center 
of his analysis. These three elements are: 
 
   “The assumption of rational state behavior, a liberal theory of 
national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis 
of interstate negotiation. The assumption of rational state behavior 
provides a general framework of analysis, within which the costs and 
benefits of economic interdependence are the primary determinants 
of national preferences, while the relative intensity of national 
preferences, the existence of alternative coalitions, and the 
opportunity for issue linkages provide the basis for an 
intergovernmental analysis of the resolution of distributional conflicts 
among governments”.17 
 
Drawing from the liberal theories of IR, which basically concentrate on state-
society relations; the foreign policy choice of states can be perceived as varying in line 
with the changing domestic preferences which are aggregated through political 
institutions in the international arena. Following the same logic, Moravcsik comes to a 
point in which he reminds the reader the salience of the national interests and the 






 See Moravcsik, A., “Negotiating Single European Act: National Interests and 
Conventional Statecraft in the European Community”, International Organization, Vol. 
45, (Winter 1991), pp. 173-205. In his article he claims that the SEA arose because of 
the converging preferences of the most important members of the EC; that is to say, 
France, Britain and Germany. Furthermore, domestic circumstances of the time were in 
favor of a more liberal European economy. 
 
16
 Moravcsik, 1993, p. 480. 
 
17
 Ibid, pp. 480-1. 
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processes in which they are bargained. To recapitulate what Moravcsik has in mind, it is 
relevant to take a look at the following lines given below: 
   “National interests are, therefore, neither invariant nor unimportant, 
but emerge through domestic political conflict as societal groups 
compete for political influence, national and transnational coalitions 
form, and new policy alternatives are recognized by governments. An 
understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, not a 
supplement to, the analysis of the strategic interaction among 
states”.18 
    
Thus liberal intergovernmentalism combines two types of general international 
relations theory which are usually perceived as contradictory to some extent: a liberal 
theory of national preference formation and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate 
bargaining and institutional creation. Hence, at this juncture, Moravcsik argues that 
“[u]nicausal explanations of European integration, which seek to isolate either demand 
or supply, are at best incomplete and at worst misleading”.19 According to Moravcsik, 
what distinguishes Moravcsik from the rest is that he does not favor one or another side 
(i.e. demand or supply side) throughout his analysis of the European integration. 
Following lines are reflections of what Moravcsik intends to mean when he refers to 
two-sided reductionism in the study of European integration: 
 
   “the demand-side reductionism- the narrow attention to variation in 
domestic preferences while ignoring the strategic context in which 
states interact- or supply-side reductionism- exclusive emphasis on 
interstate bargaining or international institutions without considering 
the underlying distribution and variation in preferences- risk omitting 
essential variables and encouraging misleading inferences about 
those that remain”.20 
 
The demand side of the process refers to the formation of national preferences and 
underlines the advantages of cooperative activity and the coordination of policy among 
the states in bargaining for their national interests; and the supply side refers to the 
domain of interstate bargaining. 
Looking at the domestic side, though the state rationality both exists in realist IR 
and in Moravcsik’s analysis, Moravcsik departs from the realist IR by stating that 
                                                
18
 Ibid, p. 481. 
 
19






rational state behavior emerges from dynamic political processes in the domestic sphere. 
He argues that “the interests of societal groups are not always sharply defined”.21 This 
variation in domestic preferences may lead heads of national governments to support or 
oppose European integration. Moravcsik verbalizes his perception on the importance of 
the domestic factors and their impacts on the integration process as follows: 
 
   “[t]he primary interest of governments is to maintain themselves in 
office; in democratic societies, this requires the support of a coalition 
of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies, whose 
views are transmitted, directly or indirectly, through domestic 
institutions and practices of political representation. Through this 
process emerges the set of national interests or goals that states bring 
to international negotiations”.22 
 
At the domestic level, three things are assumed to be working behind the support 
or opposition of national governments towards the ongoing European integration 
process. These motivations could be summarized as federalist (or nationalist) beliefs, 
national security concerns and economic interests. For Moravcsik  
 
   “The federalist motivation views European integration as a 
cosmopolitan ideal, justified by a sense of a common European 
identity and purpose. (Ideological opponents of integration may be 
motivated by an equally ideological commitment to a conception of 
the nation that places value on the preservation of sovereignty.) The 
liberal national security motivation is premised on the view of 
economic interdependence and common institutions as mean of 
reinforcing peaceful accommodation among democratic states with 
an historical legacy of conflict … or guaranteeing political support 
for specific, democratically legitimate national projects… The 
economic interdependence motivation views the EC as a means of 
co-ordinating policy to manage flows of goods, services, factors of 
production, and economic externalities more effectively than 
unilateral policies”. 23 
 
                                                
21
 Ibid, p. 484. 
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Drawing from these arguments Moravcsik himself prefers to draw conclusion from 
the economic interdependence argument and the ways in which it limits member states’ 
preferences in international bargaining.24 
Another side of the process is the supply side. It is the domain of interstate 
bargaining. Moravcsik makes three assumptions associated with the specific bargaining 
nature of the EC. First, intergovernmental co-operation in the EC is voluntary; that is to 
say, non-coercive. Second, the environment in which EC governments bargain is 
relatively information-rich. Third, the transaction costs of intergovernmental bargaining 
are low.25 
It is thus possible to observe that Moravcsik attaches a significant role to 
international institutions. They are the means to reach ‘positive sum bargaining’. That is 
to say, “international institutions may promote greater co-operation by providing 
information and reducing uncertainty. Greater information and predictability reduce the 
costs of bargaining and risk of unilateral non-compliance”.26 Institutions not only play a 
key role as facilitators in the intergovernmental bargaining process that takes place 
among the participants states; but also they  
 
   “strengthen the autonomy of national political leaders vis-à-vis 
particularistic social groups within their domestic polity.  By 
augmenting the legitimacy and credibility of common policies, and by 
strengthening domestic agenda-setting power, the EC structures a ‘two-
level game’ that enhances the autonomy and initiative of national 
political leaders”27 
 
At the ultimate level, according to Moravcsik, the particular structure of the EC 
could be advantageous in various ways. Heads of national governments can enhance 
their position against their domestic polity through the achievement of the domestic 
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1.2.1. Review of theoretical approaches to enlargement: rationalist vs. 
constructivist /sociological institutionalism 
 
 
As of today, the EU has completed five rounds of enlargement. Though the 
precise effects of all these rounds have not observed in its entirety-due to the fact that 
the process is still going on-, there are some discernible implications accruing from the 
incorporation of the new members into the Union. To recapitulate, the EU enlargement 
has not only affected the political and economic shape of Europe, but it has also 
changed the institutional set up of the EU, as well as the course of direction that the 
European integration leads to. However, it has to be remembered that since the end of 
the Cold War, with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989; the importance and priority 
attached to enlargement by the academic circles and the key political practioners has 
started to increase in an unimaginable fashion. Herewith, the EU’s decision to enlarge 
eastwards has played a key role in attracting the attentions of the scholars and the 
practioners of the politics. 
The purpose of this section is to review the debate between rationalist and 
sociological/constructivist approaches with regard to Eastern enlargement. This debate 
is two-folded: one is the theoretical side and the other is the empirical side. At the 
theoretical side, the key question is whether EU enlargement policies either fit to 
rationalist or sociological/constructivist theories of institutions. At the empirical side, 
amount of the questions seem to be somewhat excessive than the amount of questions 
posed in the theoretical side. These questions might be summarized as follows: When, 
how and why the decision to enlarge was taken? Which criteria was chosen and used 
during the selection of the candidate countries? When the Union decided to open 
accession negotiations with the candidate countries; Was there any talk of budgetary or 
institutional reform inside the EU? Or were the reforms- if necessary- already done by 
the EU before embracing the candidate countries? What were the basic components of 
the calculations of the cost of the enlargement? Were these components of an economic, 
security or institutional nature? 
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Having represented the fundamental questions investigated by the scholars both at 
the theoretical level and the empirical level, it is no surprise to guess that ‘Eastern 
enlargement of the EU is a challenging theoretical puzzle.’ 
As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have already argued “rationalism and 
constructivism do not provide us with fully elaborated and internally consistent 
competing hypotheses on enlargement that we could rigorously test against each 
other.”28 Therefore it is wise to perceive rationalist and sociological/constructivist 
theories of institutions “as partially competing and partially complementary sources of 
theoretical inspiration for the study of enlargement.” 29 
Through the rigorous efforts of various scholars in the field, the enlargement 
process in general and the Eastern enlargement in particular has turned out to be a 
significant area to test, elaborate or falsify contending theories of rationalist and 
constructivist/ sociological institutionalism.30 
When looked into the fundamentals of these two institutionalisms, it is possible to 
observe that they are based on different social ontologies (individualism and 
materialism in rationalism and ideational ontology in constructivism) and assume 
different logics of action-a rationalist logic of consequentiality opposed to constructivist 
logic of appropriateness.31 These two contending visions about the status and purposes 
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of institutions inevitably influence the theorizing enlargement in its entirety. Hence, the 
conditions, assumptions and mechanisms of enlargement have to differ according to the 
chosen logic at work. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier clearly demonstrate the basic 
differences between these two approaches as follows:   
 
   “In rationalist institutionalism, the causal status of institutions 
generally remains secondary to that of individual, material interests. 
Institutions are treated as intervening variables between the material 
interests and the material environment of the actors, on the one hand, 
and the collective outcomes, on the other. They mainly provide 
constraints and incentives, not reasons, for action; they alter 
cost/benefit calculations, not identities and interests. By contrast, in 
the constructivist perspective, institutions shape actors’ identities and 
interests. Actors do not simply confront institutions as external 
constraints and incentives towards which they behave expediently. 
Rather, institutions provide meaning to the rights and obligations 
entailed in their social roles. Actors conform with institutionally 
prescribes behavior out of normative commitment or habit.”32   
 
Accordingly, different status of institutions conceptualized in these two approaches 
also reflects itself in the importance attached to international organizations. “Rationalist 
institutionalism emphasizes the instrumental, regulatory, and efficiency-enhancing 
functions of international organizations.”33 Hence, it is fair to say in this context rational 
account views institutions as a significant constraint upon self-interested action. 
On the other hand, sociological institutionalism views “institutions as autonomous 
and powerful actors with constitutive and legitimacy-providing function.”34 In line with 
this logic, it is possible to arrive at this conclusion: 
   “international organizations are ‘community representatives’35 as 
well as community-building agencies. The origins, goals, and 
procedures of international organizations are more strongly 
determined by the standards of legitimacy and appropriateness of the 
international community they represent (which constitute their 
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cultural and institutional environment) than by the utilitarian demand 
for efficient problem-solving.”36 
 
In other words, institutions -which are defined in a rather broad term in 
sociological institutionalism in comparison with the rational account-, turn out to be 
the instrument through which the world is made meaningful to actors. For sociological 
institutionalists, “interests and identities are endogenous to (emanate from within) the 
processes of interaction that institutions represent. Interests as well as “the contexts of 
action are socially constructed- given meaning to actors- by institutional norms and 
conventions.”37 To sum up, this view clearly represents the belief in “capacity of 
cultural and organizational practices (institutions) to mould the preferences, interests 




1.2.2. The logic of appropriateness 
 
 
Simply , the logic of appropriateness means players while making up their minds, 
do not only take into account what is good for them but also what they are expected to 
do, that is to say, the roles and norms to be applied.39 It might suggest both rule-
following due to habitual practices or particular identity and rule-following based on a 
rational assessment of morally valid arguments.40 Here the causal mechanisms 
suggested in clarifying-how norms and principles can have an impact on negotiation or 
bargaining process- may alter depending on the theoretical frameworks. As already 
discussed, sociological institutionalism emphasizes the constitutive and forming effects 
of principles and norms on social actors. But these aspects of principles and norms 
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become such powerful on social actors; from here those norms and conventions of the 
institutional setting become embedded in the minds of the members of the institution. 
Thenceforwards, preferences of the social players are set so as to comply with those 
norms and principles. And eventual outcome of this interaction is that decisions are 
inevitably taken in line with those ‘constructed’ preferences.41 “Within this approach, 
the rationality of the actors is considered contextual, rather than instrumental, and 
deriving from the identity of the community they belong to.”42 As March and Olsen 
points out “human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities 
to particular situations”.43 In a similar vein, 
 
   “the criteria for social action justification rely on values stemming 
from a particular cultural context and salient concerns of the 
decision-making process have to do with the search for collective 
self-understanding and the building of a common identity, which can 
serve as the basis for developing stable goals and visions. Collective 
decisions are a matter of identity, rather than efficiency, seeking to 





1.2.3. Schimmelfennig: expansion of the international community, rhetorical 
action, and norm-based arguments 
 
 
The starting point for Frank Schimmelfennig is to clarify the reasons behind the 
decision of the EU to expand to Central and Eastern Europe?45 Throughout his whole 
work his main is to explain the theoretical puzzle which is an end result of the Eastern 
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enlargement of the EU. With this aim in mind, Schimmelfennig makes use of two 
current mainstream accounts on European integration: rationalist and 
sociological/constructivist institutionalism. While mentioning the merits of liberal 
intergovernmentalism in explaining most of the enlargement preferences of the 
member states and the formulation of the association agreements with the Central and 
Eastern European countries accruing from the bargaining process among them; he does 
not hesitate to claim that liberal intergovernmentalism fails to account for the 
Community’s decision to go beyond association and offer full membership to those 
Central and Eastern European countries. In other words, Schimmelfennig both 
demonstrates the merits and shortcomings of the rationalism (i.e., in this context, 
represented as liberal intergovernmentalism) with regard to its inability to explain 
enlargement outcomes. However, he also criticizes sociological perspective in its 
inability of explaining through which mechanisms that this enlargement has taken 
place. According to Schimmelfennig “[a]lthough rationalism can explain most actor 
preferences and much of their bargaining behavior; it fails to account for the collective 
decision for enlargement. Sociological institutionalism, in turn, can explain the 
outcome but not the input.”46 Subsequently he comes to a conclusion that neither 
isolates nor embraces the liberal intergovernmentalism in its entirety as a proper means 
to explain the whole Eastern enlargement process. See the following lines in which 
Schimmelfennig openly demonstrates what he has in his mind:  
 
   “[t]his puzzle is solved through a sociological perspective in which 
enlargement is understood as the expansion of international 
community. If the EU is conceived of as the organization of the 
European liberal community of states, its decision to open accession 
negotiations with five Central and Eastern European countries can be 
explained as the inclusion of those countries that have come to share 
its liberal values and norms.”47 
 
In other words, Schimmelfennig proposes a novel approach, rule/norm-based 
explanation of the Eastern enlargement, in which the Eastern enlargement is considered 
as the expansion of the liberal community. To explain why Eastern enlargement has 
taken place, he asks four critical questions: Why did the EU decide to expand to Central 
and Eastern Europe? Why did the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 
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want to become EU members? How did the member states of the Community agree upon 
to enlarge eastwards? And ultimately how did the members of the EU choose the new 
members from among the CEECs? 
As Schimmelfennig has argued “[s]ince its beginnings, European integration has 
been legitimated by the ideology of a pan-European community of liberal-democratic 
states.”48 Hence, he claims that these liberal establishing principles and/or rules of the 
Western international community are the key explanatory variables in understanding the 
Eastern enlargement. In other words, it was not the constellation of material, economic 
or security, interests and power that explain the normative outcome (i.e., enlargement).49  
At this juncture, it is relevant and wise to remember the analysis of Moravcsik on 
integration decisions. As previously demonstrated, three factors are important in 
Moravcsik’s analysis: the formation of member states’ preferences, the end results of 
the interstate bargaining among the member states, and the choice of international 
institutions. Schimmelfennig summarizes the fundamentals of the liberal 
intergovernmentalism of Moravcsik as such: 
 
   “His central claim [ that of Moravcsik] is that state preferences and 
international outcomes emerge from distributional conflict and reflect 
patterns of bargaining power at the domestic and the international 
level: Whereas the state preferences in European integration are 
chiefly determined by international interdependence, opportunities 
for international economic exchange, and the dominant economic 
interests in national society, substantive integration outcomes result 
from hard bargaining among states.”50 
 
By contrast, he seeks to show that, “whereas the enlargement preferences of EU 
member states and the initial bargaining process largely conform to rationalist 
expectations, the decision to enlarge the EU to Central and Eastern Europe- cannot be 
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explained as the result of egoistic cost-benefit calculations and patterns of state 
preferences and power.”51 
However, Schimmelfennig is not content to remain at what he has proposed. 
Rather, after forming this hypothesis, he bolsters his hypothesis with a brand new 
mechanism which he prefers to label as ‘rhetorical action’. He proposes “rhetorical 
action- the strategic use of norm-based arguments- as the intervening mechanism”52 in 
explaining the Eastern enlargement of the EU. 
It is through rhetorical action that the norms and/or rules, drawing from the 
ideology of pan-European community of Western liberal states, have had an impact on 
Eastern enlargement. The strategic use of rule-based arguments by the candidate 
countries is claimed to be different from the logic of appropriateness operationalized by 
the sociological/constructivist institutionalism. As already mentioned in the prior parts of 
the study, sociological institutionalists and constructivists argue that action of the social 
players are motivated and even further led by the rules of appropriate behavior. These 
rules of appropriate behavior are later adapted into institutional setting in which 
norms/rules are ensued, due to the sheer following fact, that they are perceived to be 
natural, expected and the right thing to do. 
However, what is not to be forgotten at this point is that the expansion of the liberal 
community on the basis of constitutive Pan-European rules takes its roots from 
sociological institutionalism in which social actors act not only according to exogenously 
determined utility functions of their own but also according to the values and norms that 
are endogenously part of the process of social interaction in which those actors act. On 
the other hand, rhetorical action which stands between rationalism and constructivism as 
an intervening variable can be regarded as somewhat pointing to rational institutionalism 
with its associated individualistic assumptions and its state-centeredness. 
Having said that the rhetorical action is the mechanism through which these 
constitutive liberal values of the Community have demonstrated its power on the 
members of the Community, it is important to clarify how this rhetorical action played its 
role during the Eastern enlargement. Schimmelfennig explains this process as follows: 
   “[i]n an institutional environment like the EU, political actors are 
concerned about their reputation as members and about the 
legitimacy of their preferences and behavior. Actors who can justify 
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their interests on the grounds of the community’s standard of 
legitimacy are therefore able to shame their opponents into norm-
conforming behavior and to modify the collective outcome that 
would have resulted from constellations of interests and power 
alone.”53 
 
Having clarified how did the rhetorical action get into the enlargement process; it is 
relevant at this point to remind that  
   “[s]ince the Central and Eastern European countries and their 
supporters in the Community did not possess sufficient material 
bargaining power to attain enlargement, they based their claims on 
the constitutive values and norms of the EU and exposed 
inconsistencies between, on the one hand, the EU’s standard of 
legitimacy, its past rhetoric, and its past treatment of applicant states 
and, on the other hand, its policy toward Central and Eastern 
Europe.”54 
 
Looking back at the enlargement of the CEECs, it is possible to claim that those 
countries not only explored the salience of rhetorical action but they also counted on it in 
order to it achieve their goals. They achieved their goals through -what Schimmelfennig 
prefers to call as- rhetorical argumentation and manipulating European identity. In acting 
as such,   
  “they have managed to ‘mobilize’ the institutionalized identity and 
to make enlargement an issue of credibility. Finally, in order to 
advance their individual interests in accession, they have sought to 
show not only that they share the community’s values and adhere to 
its norms, but also that they stand out from other candidates in this 
respect.”55 
 
Consequently, as Schimmelfennig has also reminded “the opponents of a firm 
commitment to Eastern enlargement found themselves rhetorically entrapped. They 
could neither openly oppose nor threaten to veto enlargement without damaging their 
credibility as community members”56 To understand the actual reason behind the 
preferred reticence of the opponents of the enlargement is not that hard:  
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  “…because this would have meant rejecting the very values and 
norms on which their membership in the Community rested and 
admitting the hypocrisy of their former public pronouncements. They 
could and did, however, base their reticence on other, potentially 









As observed in Schimmelfennig, Sjursen has also admitted that norms have 
played a part in the decision of the EU to enlarge eastwards. She has likewise 
investigated through which mechanism these norms have had an impact on the decision 
to enlarge in particular and the enlargement process as a whole. She reminds the reader 
that “actors not only used norms instrumentally in the decision to enlarge. Norms 
constitute the identity of the actors: they not only constrain their behavior, but also 
constitute their world-views and preferences. It is on this basis that enlargement must be 
understood.”58 
In order to solidify her analysis she starts with the question of “[w]hy does the EU 
enlarge and why does it make certain prioritizations among applicants in the 
enlargement process?”59 Given the high price of the enlargement, she seems apparently  
 
   “impressed by the generosity showed by the EU in welcoming ten 
new members despite their negative contribution to the EU’s per capita 
GDP, their acute financial needs in terms of structural funds of 
agricultural subsidies, their more than weak political cultures and their 
heavy impact on the efficiency of the EU’S institutional system.” 60  
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Having taken into consideration of all those factors mentioned above, Sjursen 
arrives at a conclusion that ethical-political reasons which basically refer to a feeling of 
shared identity, common history, political values, and sense of we-ness are the main 
driving forces behind the Eastern enlargement. In other words, sense of kinship-based 
duty has played a key role in mobilizing the member states for enlargement. At this 
point, she refers to the impact of two different forms of norm guided justifications: 
rights-based and value-based. She further argues that the distinction between rights-
based and value-based norms is relevant and necessary in order to get a better 
understanding of the prioritizations that have taken place throughout the EU’s Eastern 
enlargement.61 
The approach employed by Sjursen is based on two points: “first, Max Weber’s 
observation that all rulers need legitimacy in order to remain in authority; and, second, 
Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action.”62 However, what is critical is to 
answer the question of how rules, principles, norms become embedded in the minds of 
social actors? Thomas Risse points out the role of communicative action: “the processes 
by which norms are internalized and ideas become consensual…communicative 
processes are a necessary condition for ideas to become consensual (or fall by the 
wayside for that matter).”63 Hence, it is possible to argue that theories of communicative 
action which heavily draws from the work of Jürgen Habermas64 concentrate on 
processes of deliberation and argumentation, which are in turn, perceived as 
manufacturing the basic epistemic ‘glue’ that, binds actors together.65 
Last but not the least Sjursen also argues that in “Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action, actors are rational when they are able to justify and explain their 
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actions, and not only when they seek to maximize their own interests.”66 Thus by 
making reference to Habermas, Sjursen basically tries to explain that “[t[he arguments 
and reasons provided in favor of enlargement have to be of a type that others can 
support: they must be considered legitimate.”67 In addition, she prefers to follow the 
Weberian tradition by claiming that she does not aim to “predict the final outcome of 
the enlargement process, but to analyze the reasons why we have come to where we are 
now in the enlargement process.”68 That is to say, she explicitly states that she is a part 
of the Weberian tradition in which social science ‘is a science concerning itself with the 
interpretative understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its 
course and consequences.’ 69 
While attempting to demonstrate the ethical-political justification argument 
Sjursen “rel[ies] on a particular conception of the collective ‘us’ and a particular idea of 
the values represented by a specific community. In this context, she seeks to justify 
enlargement by referring to duties and responsibilities emerging as a result of belonging 
to a particular community.”70 As already discussed, this is very much in line with the 
logic of appropriateness as opposed to the logic of consequentiality. But it is wise to 
remember that Sjursen does not attempt to undermine the importance of utility 
considerations throughout the whole enlargement process; instead, she tries to provide 
new insights into the puzzle of Eastern enlargement of the EU by introducing two 
further dimensions: a ‘value’ dimension and a ‘rights’ dimension. 71 Hence, utility-
dimension which is firmly advocated by Moravcsik can only be the one way of 
understanding the decision to behind the Eastern enlargement of the EU. 
To put it simply, Sjursen agrees with the belief in the capability of norms in 
shaping the social actors’ preferences and decisions. Sjursen verbalizes her point of 
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view regarding the salience and impact of norms in shaping the actions of the social 
actors as follows: 
   “…from the perspective adopted here, norms do not only constrain 
actors’ behavior, as the sociological-institutionalist perspectives on 
enlargement suggest. Norms constitute the preferences and world-
views of actors. This perspective is particularly useful for analyzing 
enlargement because it is not simply a pragmatic issue. It raises 
questions not only of a technical or economic nature and empirical 
knowledge may not be enough to resolve the issue of enlargement. 
The perennial issues of ‘what is Europe’ and ‘who can the EU 
legitimately claim to represent’ inevitably arise with enlargement.”72 
 
Accordingly, Sjursen also points out the difficulty in finding an exact definition 
and way of determination to concretize the norms, constitutive principles, and rules of 
the Union. It is still problématique to give a precise answer to the question of where 
Europe starts and ends and what is the EU’s collective identity and vice versa. 
In this critical juncture, Sjursen proposes the utilization of ethical-political 
arguments and moral approach in understanding the justification that might have led 
actors to support enlargement. See the following lines below in which Sjursen depicts 
the way she follows in dealing and explaining the salience of the constitutive values of 
the Community:  
   “ethical-political arguments are revealed through references to values 
and traditions that are seen as constitutive of European identity. One 
would thus use arguments and statements that explicitly include or 
exclude people from a European ‘community’ and perhaps also make 
efforts to describe people as part of a common cultural entity (or not). 
Indicators of a feeling of a community of values can also be references 
to ‘duty’ and solidarity with those that are seen as ‘one of us’, as 
opposed to references to justice and rights that would have a broader 
address. This last dimension is thus what has been labeled a moral 
approach to justification.”73 
 
Accordingly, main arguments presented by Sjursen can be boiled down as such:  
enlargement should not only be perceived as a process of extension of international 
community based on the norms of pan-European liberal ideology but rather enlargement 
should be read as a process in which norms based on a common institutional-identity, 
sense of we-ness. Therefore, for Sjursen, the decision of the EU to enlarge eastwards 
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Whole discussion about the theories of EU enlargement has thus far revolved 
around the two competing logics of integration: logic of consequentiality and logic of 
appropriateness. These two different logics of integration have made themselves visible 
in two different types of institutionalism: rational institutionalism and 
sociological/constructivist institutionalism. In the rational institutionalist camp, Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism of Andrew Moravcsik has been chosen to be a representative of 
the logic of consequentiality. Here material considerations (economic, security, and 
political levels) have been regarded as the forces which have impacted the enlargement 
policies of the EU. On the opposite side of the debate, in the sociological/constructivist 
institutionalism, EU’s constitutive norms, principles and collective identity have been 
demonstrated as being the primary driving forces of the EU enlargement. Two 
complementary visions have been selected to depict the sociological/constructivist 
institutionalism: (i) Schimmelfennig has proposed a novel mechanism by means of 
which those norms and principles have made their impacts on the social actors visible. 
He called this mechanism as rhetorical action. (ii) Helene Sjursen has likewise 
emphasized the importance of constitutive norms and principles of the EU’s Eastern 
enlargement. However, she has also highlighted the salience of communicative action of 
Habermas as opposed to rhetorical action of Schimmelfennig as regards to the EU’s 
enlargement policy. Further, she has also demonstrated that prioritizations in the EU’s 
enlargement policy have occurred and created some advantageous outcomes for some 
candidate countries. She has reminded that collective identity arguments have impacted 
the EU’s Eastern enlargement. Kinship-based arguments, according to Sjursen, have 
played a significant role in the admittance of the CEECs in the latest EU enlargement in 
May 2004. 
In light of the discussion above it is no surprise that this chapter is an attempt to 
reconcile arguments based on the strategic considerations of costs with those based on 
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bargaining and following institutionalizations of norms, rules and principles. According 
to Torreblanca, throughout the whole Eastern enlargement a middle-ground has been 
found to accommodate interests and principles in the EU.75 In other words, EU 
enlargement policy has found a middle ground to move in a normative direction (hence 
meeting the EU’s constitutive norms and principles) and, in the mean time, let member 
states to protect and maximize their material interests.76 To put the theoretical findings 
in context, and demonstrate how the big picture looks like from the outside when two 
contending visions of enlargement are positioned one against another; it is inevitably 
necessary to summarize all the findings of the chapter through an illustrative table. 
 
Table 1: Summary of the Contending Visions about Enlargement Policy 
 Rational Institutionalism Sociological/Constructivist Institutionalism 
Principal 
Logic 
Interest-driven  bargaining 
and negotiation (i.e. logic of 
consequentiality) 
Principle, norm, and shared-identity-





making and institutional 
power (coalition-building 
agenda setting, and veto )   
Norm and principle entrepreneurs 
(the European Commission, etc.).  
Adjustment 
Mechanism 
Bargaining and strategic 
negotiation about the costs 
of the enlargement 
Social learning and preference 
changes 
Source: created from the concepts developed by Moravcsik, 1993 and 1998; Rosamond, 
2000; Schimmelfennig, 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002; Sjursen, 2002; 
Torreblanca, 2002; Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 2005. 
 
 
In light of the summary given in Table 1, it is possible to see a group of utility-
driven actors in the rational institutionalism, bargaining for their own national interests 
in the issues concerning the enlargement policy. The primary consideration is the 
relative weight of costs vis-à-vis the benefits for each individual country in matters of 
enlargement. Since the social players act as utility-maximizers (i.e. doing what is most 
beneficial for their own national interests) these players are expected to make use of 
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strategic bargaining and negotiations among them. In other words, logic of 
consequentiality is the driving force behind the entire enlargement process. 
As for sociological/constructivist institutionalism, social players are supposed to 
follow the logic of appropriateness through the guidance of norm/principle 
entrepreneurs like the European Commission. Decisions on enlargement policy thus are 
supposed to be taken in accordance with the constitutive norms, principles and the 
shared identity of the Union. In other words, logic of appropriateness governs the entire 
enlargement policy and the subsequent process. From the entire discussion presented in 
Table 1, it is thus possible to reach the following arguments given in Table 2: 
 
Table 2: Arguments about Enlargement Policy 
 Rational Institutionalism Sociological/Constructivist Institutionalism 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Relative weight and 
allocation of enlargement 
costs on individual 
member states 




Polemical, unwilling and 
retarded 
Collective and communal, willing 
and without delay 
Enlargement 
Criteria Biased and cost- driven Unbiased  and principle/norm-driven 
Timing 
Allocation of costs lead 
enlargement; thus,  
enlargement takes place 
slowly and/or in stages 
Consideration on principles, and 
norms lead enlargement; thus,  
enlargement progresses fast 
Allocation of 
Costs 
Costs are transferred or 
passed on individual 
member states 
Individual member states consent to 
stand the cost among them 
Outcome of the 
Enlargement 
Policy 
Individual member states’ 
interests govern the 
enlargement process. 
Constitutive rules, principles and 
norms govern the enlargement 
process. 
Source: created from the concepts developed by Moravcsik, 1993 and 1998; Rosamond, 
2000; Schimmelfennig, 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002; Sjursen, 2002; 
Torreblanca, 2002; Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 2005. 
 
 
As shown in Table 2, two different logics of integration- which make themselves 
visible in two different types of institutionalism- cause enlargement policy outcomes to 
differ form each other. In the rational institutionalism, size and allocation of costs are 
the primary concerns of the actors and those concerns reflect themselves in the 
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bargaining and negotiation process. In the final analysis, national interests vis-à-vis the 
communal interests govern the enlargement policy. 
In the context of the sociological/constructivist institutionalism, decisions taken 
throughout the enlargement process are forced to be in line with the constitutive 
principles, norms and collective identity of the Community. Thus, communal 
principles and norms dominate the entire enlargement process.  
Having demonstrated all layers of the debate, it is therefore relevant to display 
how the two logics of integration fit into enlargement policy. In order to do so, see the 
following table, Table 3, in which logics of integration are applied into enlargement 
policy.  
 
Table 3: Applying the Two Logics of Integration into Enlargement Policy 
 Logic of Consequentiality Logic of Appropriateness 
Deliberation  
A strategic bargaining and negotiation 
process with vested interests and 
preferences where social players 
foresee outcomes and act accordingly 
without taking into consideration of 
the prosperity of the rest. 
A process of social learning 
in which social players act 
in line with what their 
identities or roles assign 
them to do. 
Aim 
To enhance the material position of 
the member states (interests and 
preferences of the member states are 
primary and must be elevated to an 
upper level in comparison with the 
prior situation).  
To create or empower a 
shared identity and to 
construct a union of interest 
or purpose with the 
candidate. 
End Result 
An interest-driven decision which 
manifests the allocation of the costs 
with respect to power relations of 
actors throughout the bargaining and 
negotiation process. 
An opinion implying 
consensual determination 
with respect to a set of 
principles, values and 
norms. 
Source: created from the concepts developed by Moravcsik, 1993 and 1998; Rosamond, 
2000; Schimmelfennig, 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002; Sjursen, 2002; 
Torreblanca, 2002; Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 2005. 
 
 
When two logics of integration are applied into enlargement policy as in Table 3, 
it is obvious that rational institutionalists act as utility maximizers and results from this 
perspective are in tendency to mirror the relative distribution of power among the 
players. At that point it is vitally important and timely necessary to recollect what 
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Piedrafita and Torreblanca once wrote about the enlargement policy with respect to 
rationalist institutionalism: 
   “At the aggregate level, enlargement could then be modeled as a 
power game in which the EU seeks to maximize the benefits of an 
expanding membership in terms of economic, political and security 
gains and, at the same time, minimize the costs of accepting new 
members (in terms of budgetary, economic and political impact of the 
new members on the EU’s economy, budget and institutions).”77 
 
Thus, collective decisions are matter of material considerations in the rational 
institutionalism. At the extreme side, in the sociological/constructivist institutionalism, 
“[c]ollective decisions are a matter of identity, rather than efficiency… and to do with 
the search for collective self-understanding and the building of a common identity, 








This chapter is an attempt to analyze Eastern enlargement of the EU from the two 
competing versions of new institutionalism. That is to say, enlargement is examined 
from the lenses of rational institutionalism on the one hand and the 
sociological/constructivist institutionalism on the other hand. Although these two 
visions might seem to be contending, it is the aim of the study in general and the chapter 
in particular that these two visions should not be taken as totally competing against each 
other; rather, they should be perceived partially competing as well as partially 
complementary with regard to their explanatory power in explaining the EU politics of 
enlargement. 
With regard to enlargement, rational institutionalists claim that players live in a 
world in which they seek to maximize their utility which is represented in the form of 
economic or security preferences. In case of a conflict of interests, players make use of 
negotiations with the aim of distributing the benefits or accommodating the costs among 
themselves. Correspondingly, outcome of the negotiations is akin to manifest the 
distribution and asymmetries of power among the players. In a nutshell, both at the 
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member state level and the applicant state level, enlargement preferences are shaped by 
the calculation of expected cost-benefit of each individual state. Accordingly, each actor 
seeks to maximize the net benefits of its own. Nonetheless, as Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier have already argued   
   “it is not necessary that enlargement as such is beneficial to each 
member. Enlargement can also result from unequal bargaining power 
among the incumbents. Member states that expect net losses from 
enlargement will agree to enlargement if their bargaining power is 
sufficient to obtain full compensation through side-payments by the 
winners (which, in turn, requires that the necessary concessions do 
not exceed the winners’ gains from enlargement). Otherwise, the 
losers will consent to enlargement if the winners are able to threaten 
them credibly with exclusion (and if the losses of exclusion for the 
loser exceed the losses of enlargement).”79  
 
As opposed to rationalist account, sociological/constructivist institutionalism sees 
enlargement as shaped by the ideational, cultural factors. Therefore analysis of 
enlargement is tantamount to the analysis of social identities, norms, values, rules.80 
Accordingly, enlargement politics inevitably focus on the “collective identity, the 
constitutive beliefs and practices of the community, and norms and rules of the 
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Since the start of accession negotiations on October 3, 2005, Turkey-EU relations 
have entered a new phase. Turkey as an aspiring country aiming to enter into the EU, 
with the longest history of waiting at the doors of European Union, is now an official 
candidate country bargaining to be a full member of the EU.  Nevertheless, in order to 
understand the nature of the relationship between the EU and Turkey one ought to look 
back at Turkey’s EU bid from the lenses of history. The reason is quite simple. Turkey’s 
European vocation is not a new phenomenon. It dates back almost to last two hundred 
years of the Ottoman Empire. In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the 
Ottomans, for the first time, felt the urgent necessity to turn their faces towards Europe 
in various spheres. They were aware that they were lacking behind Europe; therefore, 
through enforcement coming from outside of the Ottoman territory, the Ottomans 
consented to the idea of caching up with Europe. 1839 Reformation (Tanzimat) 
Movement was the first example of this trend in the Ottomans. The process of 
emulating and competing with the West in general and Europe in particular continued 
till the last days of the Empire. As already known the New Republic of Turkey was 
founded by the Young educated Ottoman elites, on the lands which were once the 
territory of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, it is no coincidence that Turkey’s relationship 
with Europe has to some extent displayed similarities with that of the Ottomans’. The 
Ottomans had always had difficulty in putting their relations with Europe in a steady 
state. Their relations with Europe were full of ups and downs. The same pattern can also 
be somehow observed in case of the newly established Republic of Turkey of 1920s and 
in the over-80years-existent today’s Turkey. Thus, before going deep down of the 
current state of affairs between Turkey and the EU, it is timely and wise to revisit the 
dusty shelves of the history of Turkey-EU relations, with the aim of shedding light on 
the present situation. It has to be reminded that concurrent problems between Turkey 
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and the EU can not be fully explained without taking into consideration the past 
structuring of the Turkish Republic due to the fact that the Republican rhetoric is still 
alive in the present Turkish political life and culture. To get a better understanding of 
the current framework of Turkey-EU relations, a superficial look82 at the Ottoman 








 “…There is only one way to escape these dangers… in other words to equal them in 
civilization. And the only way to do this is to enter European civilization completely.”83  
                                                                                                          
                                                                                         (Ziya Gokalp 1876-1924) 
 
With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, after the First World War, Turkey was 
founded by Mustafa Kemal and his friends. The Kemalist elites followed an inward-
looking nationalism while trying to adopt western-oriented development policies for 
the new-born Republic. Since its establishment, Turkey has chosen to follow the path 
which was once pursued by the contemporary Western nations. The West, which 
basically meant Europe both for the Ottoman Empire and the young Republic of 
Turkey, was the last destination that needed to be reached. The Ottomans once desired 
to be a part of the Western influence sphere. They did want to reach the same level of 
development as their European counterparts did. To be regarded as Western, in 
particular, European was tantamount to be civilized, developed, and privileged. The 
founding elites of the Republic were no different than their Ottoman peers when it 
came to deal with the matters like the West, Westernization and Europe. Thus, it is 
wise to recall that Turkey’s aspiration to become a part of the Western world, 
especially the world of the Europeans which has always symbolized the West, is not 
something new and unknown.  This chapter is opened with a statement of Ziya Gokalp, 
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which has to be reminded at this point; that he was one of the most nationalist thinkers 
of the Late Ottoman Empire; and, his ideology to a great extent impacted the minds of 
the founding elites of Turkey. As Gokalp put it rather clearly, there was only destiny 
set forth for the people of Turkey: the West. To enter into the world of European 
civilization was set to be the primary goal. To do as such, principle of Westernization 
(i.e. catching up with Europeans in spheres of technology, economy and etc and 
emulating and even importing their styles except the matters of culture) was utilized. 
When framed as such Gokalp’s aforementioned statement clearly displays the 
underlying reason behind Turkey’s aspiration to be regarded as member of the 
contemporary world, that is to say, Europe. The principle of Westernization was chosen 
by the Turkish elites to be the mechanism which would facilitate the transition from a 
theocratic Ottoman Empire to a secular young Turkish Republic. This was to be done 
by imitating the West which consisted of a group of countries which were regarded as 
secular, civilized and democratic. Actually, westernization was an end result of this 
newly-established country’s desire to survive in its own and provide the continuity of 
the nineteenth century reform movements of the late Ottoman Empire.84 In this context, 
the principle of Westernization can be considered as a legacy inherited from the Late 
Ottomans by means of which the entry into the civilized world was assumed to be 
made possible.  
The principle of Westernization was not the only fundamental legacy that the 
Turkish elites inherited from the Ottomans. The Ottomans also bequeathed a highly 
diversified demographic structuring: under the territory of the Ottomans lived many 
groups (i.e. Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Greeks, and Jews) which were ethnically, 
linguistically, and culturally rather different from each other. The way that the 
Ottomans interpreted Islam, practice of tolerance and respect towards non-Muslim 
groups hold these vastly divided communities together. Besides, those non-Muslim 
groups were granted citizenship and the right to practice religion as they wished.85 
Eventually, the infamous ‘Sevres Syndrome’86 (referring to the 1920 Peace Treaty 
                                                
84
 Oran, B., Turk Dis Politikasi: Kurtulus Savasindan Bugune Olgular Belgeler 
Yorumlar, (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2003), p.50. 
 
85
  Khosla, I. P., “Search for a Role”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 25, No.3, 2002, p.346. 
 
86
 Despite the fact that the Treaty of Sevres (1920) was never put into practice, 
essentially it was the culmination of the desire of achieving the territorial partition of 
 36 
between the World War One victors and the Ottoman Empire) cast doubts as to the 
goodwill of Western powers towards the Turks.87 From time to time, this perception 
nevertheless became apparent in the context of Turkey-EU relations. The most obvious 
example of the revival of this syndrome in the collective memory of some Turkish 
circles was the very days following the Luxembourg Council of 1997 in which 
Turkey’s elevation to the candidate status was denied. 
In light of these arguments, Kemalism (i.e. the founding ideology of the Turkish 
state) can be considered to have “[b]ecome a kind of loose state ideology, one that was 
grounded in state paternalism and corporatism, a pronounced role for the military, 
economic modernization, and steadfast secularism.”88 
Despite the difficulties faced during the consolidation of the fledgling Turkey 
between 1923 and 1945, and the very existence of nationalistic, inward-looking 
domestic policies; plus, neutral foreign policy, Turkey gave up its neutral position and 
moved towards cooperation with western organizations. Turkey’s march to the West 
became apparent in the early 1950s. First, Turkey joined the OECD in 1948; this was 
followed by membership of the Council of Europe in 1949 and NATO in 1952. 
Becoming part of those western organizations could in a way be interpreted as the 
rejuvenation of Turkey’s European vocation and effort to enter into the Western orbit. 
Hence The Cold War provided a golden opportunity for Turkey to be acknowledged as 
a European power.  Turkey’s strategic importance and military capacity rendered it a 
perfect and powerful partner for the western alliance against the Soviet threat.89 
Through its membership to various Western institutions, Turkey was able to get 
into a close contact with the Western Community. Nonetheless, by rejecting to attend 
the Asian Conference in 1949, speaking on behalf of the West at the Bandung 
                                                                                                                                          
Turkey. It was both the symbol of the Ottoman defeat and the Turkish national 
resistance. This event is generally uttered with the Kurdish question and is still existent   
under the name of ‘Sevres Syndrome’, which implies that there is an international 
conspiracy aiming to weaken and to divide Turkey.  
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Conference of Asian and African Nations in 1955, and siding with the colonialist 
powers against Algerian and other independence movements in the late 1950s Turkey 
explicitly demonstrated that it was willingly committed to all initiatives of Europe and 
siding with Europe almost in every possible sphere.90 The next step for Turkey to 
follow was not to confine itself only with its political and diplomatic ties with the West 
but also to find a way to establish certain economic ties with the Western Community. 








Turkey formally applied for associate membership of the newly founded EEC in 
July 1959 sixteen days after the Greek application. The underlying reasons behind 
Turkey’s application could be summed up as follows: “the culmination of Turkish 
orientation to the West; gaining free access for Turkish exports to the European market; 
and providing stimulus for economic growth; and on top of that Greece’s application to 
the EEC.”91 
An association agreement between Turkey and the EEC was signed on September 
12, 1963, two years after the ending of a similar association agreement with Greece; and 
it came into effect on December 1, 1964. “From the Community’s point of view, both 
countries were important NATO partners, critical for western security interests in the 
Cold War context.”92 In addition, Turkish association “was a way of drawing a strategic 
ally into its ranks as well as preserving the balance between Greece and Turkey; 
however, [a]s for Turkey, it was the door to Europe.”93 
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As Kubicek has argued “[m]embership , for a variety of reasons-most obviously 
Turkey’s level of economic development-was not on the table, but, very significantly, 
the EEC then agreed that Turkey was eligible for membership on geographic 
grounds.”94 
In other words, “[t]he Ankara Agreement was opening the door to Customs Union 
and   full membership by envisaging a stage by stage integration process following the 
successful completion of preparatory and the transitional stages.”95 The preparatory 
stage was completed on January 1, 1970. The Additional Protocol was signed on 
November 23, 1970; thenceforth came into effect on January 1, 1973 with “the ultimate 








Throughout this period a number of factors contributed to the deterioration of 
relations between Turkey and the Community. “[T]hese were the enlargement of the 
Community from six to nine in 1972, the 1973 oil crisis and the 1974 crisis over 
Cyprus.”97 
Starting from the last one, the 1974 crisis over Cyprus marked a turning point in 
Turkey’s relation with the Community as well as Greece. Turkish military intervention 
to Cyprus in 1974 was eventually followed by the overthrown of the military junta in 
Greece. “The new government of Constantine Karamanlis applied for full membership 
in 1975. Greece saw the full membership card as a golden opportunity to consolidate its 
newly born fragile democratic regime with the aim of containing the security threat 
from Turkey.”98 Furthermore, the way that the Community handled with the conflict 
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dismantled the delicate balance in favor of Greece. The Turkish side felt isolated from 
Europe and this event increased the Turks’ mistrust of the Europeans.99 
In September 1978, Turkey froze its relation with the Community resorting to the 
Article 60 of the Additional Protocol, the Self-Protection Clause. Turkey was to a great 
extent dissatisfied with the credibility and commitment of the Community with regard 
to the Association Agreement. In the meantime, the Community was undecided to 
classify Turkey’s position in Europe. Was Turkey a part of the Community’s 
Mediterranean Policy or an associate member of the Community? 
While all these were happening between the Community and Turkey, Spain and 
Portugal applied for full membership with the courage they took from the Greek 
example. Eventually, in 1979, Greece signed an Accession Treaty with the EC and the 
ultimate outcome of this relatively short time period of transition culminated with the 
full membership of Greece to the EC as the new tenth member of the Community. 
Despite the efforts coming from the Turkish side to catch up the Greek example, 
with the aim of making a formal application to the EC by the autumn of 1980, Turkish 
military took over the regime on September 12, 1980. This resulted with the freezing of 








One can easily argue that the 1980s were the years of rapid and radical 
transformation for Turkey as well as the EC. At the beginning of the 1980s Turkey 
shifted its economic policies and started implementing neo-liberal, market oriented 
economic policies. Though the process of liberalization of the financial markets and the 
privatization of the state enterprises were not an easy task to deal with, the steady 
transformation process began to flourish after the holding of multiparty (i.e., 
democratic) elections in 1983. Under the initiative of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, 
Turkey applied for full membership on April 14, 1987 on the basis of the Rome Treaty, 
which gave right to any European country to apply for full membership.  
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   “Although the European Commission noted Turkey’s eligibility, its 
Opinion of December 18, 1989 which detailed serious economic and 
political difficulties about Turkey, rendered Turkish accession 
unlikely, such as the expansion of political pluralism, the state of 
democracy, the persistence of disputes with a Member State (namely 
Greece), the lack of a viable solution to the Cyprus problem, relative 
economic backwardness, especially in macroeconomic terms, the 
Kurdish question, and problems related to human rights.”100 
 
It was also mentioned that another wave of enlargement was not yet seen possible 
at least till 1993. Subsequently, the continuation of the Customs Union with Turkey 
was recommended. Meanwhile Europe was performing a great deal of transformation 
in both the realm of politics and economics. The aim to complete the single market in 
the realm of economics and the emphasis on the quality and sustainability of human 
rights, democracy, and the rule of law within the political context were two apparently 
crucial parameters for Europe. And eventually this Europe (i.e., the European 
Community) was transformed into the European Union with the signing of Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992. This paved the way for ‘further integration’ movement which was to 
flourish within Europe. Hence the former Communist states in Central and Eastern 
Europe applied for the EU membership. Those former Communist states eventually 
“concluded association agreements, received large amounts of EU aid (far more than 
Turkey), and awaited a decision on their membership application.”101 Besides, in 1993, 
through the introduction of Copenhagen Criteria in the Copenhagen Council, minimum 
prerequisites for the candidate countries were eventually set forth. The criteria for 
membership were set as follows: “(i) stable institutions, democracy, respect for human 
rights, and rule of law (ii) a functioning market economy and a capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure, and (iii) an ability to take on the obligations of membership such 
as the adherence to aims and policies of the Union.”102 
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In light of the developments taking place in the EU, Turkey-EU relations were 
revitalized in the early 1990s.103 Hence, on March 6, 1995, Turkey signed the Customs 
Union Agreement with the EU.  
 
   “As the Customs Union became a reality by the end of 1995, 
Europeans tended to place much more emphasis on political factors 
and the limitations of Turkish democracy, as opposed to earlier 
periods where the primacy emphasis was always the development gap 
and the relative underdevelopment of the Turkish economy.”104  
 
As seen above, European political elites were no longer satisfied with “[t]he mere 
existence of representative democracy…as a qualification for full-membership…on the 
political front.”105 When framed as such, it is no surprise that the logic of 
consequentiality had started to pave the way for the logic of appropriateness. In the EU, 
merely interest-driven and instrumental -oriented logic were not any more the only 
engine of the integration. That is to say, “deep integration in Europe by the beginning of 
the 1990s had a fundamentally different meaning attached to it compared to Turkey’s 
first encounter with the Community back in the early 1960s.”106 Despite the poor human 
rights record of Turkey; plus, the  European Parliaments adamant policy regarding this 
issue, the likelihood of the EP’s possible assent on the Customs Union was seen rather 
low. Nonetheless, in contrast to expectations, on March 1995, the EP gave its consent 








At the Luxembourg European Council of December 12, 1997, “the EU agreed that 
several post [C]ommunist states were ready to begin membership negotiations, having 
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sufficiently met the Copenhagen Criteria.”107 That is to say, the EU set the time table for 
the accession negotiations with six candidate countries, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the 
Czech Republic, Slovenia and Cyprus for the next year. “Turkey, however, was 
pointedly excluded.”108 As Muftuler-Bac and McLaren have pointed out “Turkey’s 
application… was apparently ignored despite the hopes raised by the experience of the 
Customs Union with the EU.”109 The EU explained this rationalized this outcome by 
stating that “Turkey failed to meet the economic and political aspects of the 
Copenhagen Criteria for membership and thus could not join the EU.”110 Not 
surprisingly, “[t]his outcome provoked extreme hostile reactions from within Turkey, 
and led to even further doubt about whether the EU was serious about ever including 
Turkey.”111 For example, Tufan Turenc of Hurriyet (i.e. one of the most circulated 
newspapers of Turkey) wrote “Europe, Go to Hell” in response to the ignorance of the 
Turkish application by the EU in the Luxembourg European Council Summit.112 
In addition, some European leaders’ rather straightforward declarations about 
Turkey made the matters worse. For example, Luxembourg’s Jean Claude Juncker, the 
EU president of the time, proclaimed that “the EU should not negotiate with a country 
where there is torture”.113 Likewise, the Belgian Christian Democratic Party Leader 
Wilifried Martens declared that Turkey’s culture rendered it ‘unacceptable’ for the EU 
membership.114 “In response to the Luxembourg decision, Turkey froze all political 
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dialogue with the EU and declined to participate in the European Conference convened 
in March 1998 for candidate countries.”115 
As seen from the above statements of European leaders of the time, majority of 
the objections to the Turkish application were associated with the matters of political 
concerns. By and large, they were giving emphasis on political and human rights 
records of Turkey. This is not to suggest, however, that the logic of consequentiality lost 
its importance in leading the EU integration project in those times. Rather, with the start 
of the 1990s, the ‘deep integration’ process of the EU made political concerns visible 
and; thus, opened the way for the political integration while strengthening the economic 
integration.  this is  As for Turkey, The Ankara Agreement of 1963 had already sealed 
Turkey’s indisputable Europeanness; therefore, there should not have been any 
confusion so as to render Turkey to be given full membership or not. As a matter of 
fact, the Association Agreement had only been signed for the purpose of full 
membership. There was no alternative but the full membership for the Turkish side with 
regard to the EU. Europeans’ emphasis on structural problems and their constant efforts 
to remind Turkey about its political and cultural constraints in its EU bid made Turkey 
feel like as it was the victim of double standard. Hence, “Turkey’s feeling of isolation 








In the Helsinki European Council, “the EU agreed to treat Turkey as it had the 
post [C]ommunist states although it continued to recognize that Turkey fell short on the 
Copenhagen Criteria and, thus, was not eligible (as other states were) for immediate 
accession negotiations.”117 In other words, the EU changed its policy towards Turkey 
and granted “an officially explicit candidate status to Turkey which produced 
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considerable optimism on Turkey’s part.”118 As Kubicek has argued “the Helsinki 
decision was hailed by Turks as a major victory and an affirmation of their European 
aspirations.”119 Several reasons could be summarized in order to understand  the logic 
behind the elevation of Turkey to the candidate country status: (i) crucial decisions were 
taken to consolidate European security and defense in Helsinki; and in the light of  
Turkey’s  strategic importance in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Eurasia it was 
no coincidence that Europeans attitude changed sharply.120 ; (ii) The changing approach 
of Greece towards Turkey-EU relations121; (iii) replacement of Helmut Kohl by Gerhard 
Schroeder as German Chancellor and hence the policy change towards Turkey.122 
Despite the apparent differences lying for Turkey on its road to the EU, the start of 
accession process turned into a powerful catalyst and paved the way for Turkey’s firmly 
anchoring itself to its European bid. As seen from the Helsinki European Council of 
1999 in which Turkey has given the official candidate status, logic of appropriateness 
for this time worked in favor of Turkey. Logic of appropriateness previously revealed 
itself in the rejection of Turkey’s application in 1987 by the Commission and the denial 
of Turkey’s expectation to be elevated to the official candidate status in 1997 in 
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122Avci, G., 2002, p.98 in which Avci suggests that prior to the Summit  Schroeder and 
his Foreign Minister Fischer already knew the difficulty of having Turkey in the EU as 
full member. Nonetheless, with the aim of demonstrating the EU as a secular entity 
which would embrace all the European cultures regardless of religion, they played their 











As Gamze Avci has argued after the 1999 Helsinki European Council Decision to 
give Turkey an official candidate status, a “political avalanche of democratization” 
happened in Turkey.123 The Turkish government displayed considerable degree of 
commitment and enthusiasm with the aim of fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria. 
Subsequent efforts of the Turkish government can be summed up as follows:  
 
   “The government quickly passed a National Program for the 
Adoption of the EU Acquis that accompanied the Copenhagen 
Criteria and pushed through an impressive list of reforms: abolition of 
the death penalty, expanded freedom of expression, curtailment of the 
power of the military, release of political prisoners, dozens of 
constitutional amendments, and more freedom for the use and study 
of Kurdish, which previously had been prohibited.”124 
 
In light of these developments, it is possible to argue that the Helsinki decision 
encouraged Turks to improve their democratic and political credentials vis-à-vis the EU. 
Post-Helsinki reforms taking place in Turkey strengthened the cards in Turkey’s hands 
in its way to the Copenhagen Summit in 2002. In the meantime, Turkey was 
accelerating its reform process; however, this did not equal to mean that efforts to 
implement the reforms were sufficient enough to satisfy the meet the Copenhagen 
political criteria. The EU, thus, clearly stated that Turkey’s efforts were not sufficient 
enough to open the accession talks. Subsequently, the EU demanded to see a further 
progress in line with the practical implementation of all the previous reforms initiated 
by the Turkish government since 2001. At the Copenhagen Summit,  Turkey was given 
an exact date, namely December 2004, with the prospect of opening accession talks on 
the condition of proper implementation of reform packages and meeting the 
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Copenhagen political criteria. Through setting a certain date for the start of accession 
talks between Turkey and the EU, the Copenhagen European Summit paved the way for 
acceleration of the pace of Turkey’s reform process, which had already been initiated in 
2001. 
Despite the existence of positive developments taking place between Turkey and 
the EU, “[c]ertain issues (for example, adoption of a new penal code, protection of 
religious minorities, recognition of Cyprus) would linger and complicate EU-Turkish 
relations through 2004.”125 Eventually, in December 2004, the EU agreed that Turkey 
sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria; thus, accession talks were to be open in 
October 2005 between Turkey and the EU, subject to certain conditions. The set of 
conditions were taken under tough and tense bargaining within the EU 25 leaders over 
how rigid the requirements on Turkey should be and also over Cyprus’s perseverance 
that Turkey ought to give a full recognition to Cyprus. These conditions have to do with 
the guaranteeing of the continuation of Turkish reform program and enforcing Turkey 
to implicitly recognize Cyprus through signing of an updated Customs Union agreement 
with all twenty five EU states. As has already mentioned, 
 
    “[T]urkey's road to membership remains paved with a multitude of 
challenges if not obstacles. Some of these challenges actually stem 
from the "buts" and qualifications built into the decision to open 
accession talks; another set stems from Europe and Turkey itself. Yet 
these challenges or difficulties cannot hide the fact that the European 
Council is heralding a new era both for Europe as well as Turkey 
with potential repercussions for the regions beyond Turkey. These 
give the decision of opening accession talks on December 2004 a 
historic quality.”126 
 
When looked into the long history of Turkey-EU relations, for many Turks, the 
December 2004 decision was a long-awaited affirmation of Turkey’s European 
vocation, a project whose roots date to the beginning of the Turkish Republic.127 The 
opening of accession talks on 3 October 2005 was sealed the decision taken in 
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article 8 (December 2004). 
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December 2004; and thus, Turkey-EU relations entered into a new phase in which the 
willingness of the both two sides were to determine the fate of the Turkish membership. 
It is no hard to notice that “[m]uch of the debate over Turkey’s application until 
December 2004 revolved around whether Turkey had done enough to meet the political 
criteria of Copenhagen.”128  Nonetheless, as the Turkish accession become a crude 
reality in the EU circles through the opening of accession talks on 3 October 2005, talks 
about the Turkish membership have gained a new direction and so do the arguments 
against the Turkish membership. As Karlsson has brilliantly pointed out  
  
   “[t]he arguments against a Turkish EU membership that have been 
used so far have lost much of their force in view of the rapid reform 
process launched by the Erdogan government and the result of the 
referendum in Cyprus. Consequently, those who are opposed to 
Turkey’s membership now talk less about the country’s ‘EU maturity’ 
and the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria. Instead they argue that 
EU cannot absorb a new member of the size of Turkey that a Turkish 
membership would cause serious geopolitical and strategic problems 
and, last but not the least that EU is a community based on Christian 
values.”129  
 
In sum, a new phase in Turkey-EU relations has started with the beginning of 
accession talks in October 2005. Obviously, eventual Turkish membership is not 
guaranteed. As has already been stated by Karlsson above, it is possible to see a shift in 
change of attitudes in the EU circles vis-à-vis the Turkish membership.  Hence, the 








When Turkey first signed the Association Agreement with the then the European 
Economic Community in 1959, nobody had ever dreamt about the possibility of the 
Community’s turning into a political union. In those times, “the EEC was an economic 
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organization and the political integration that we see today existed only in the dreams of 
the most ambitious architects of the European project.”130 As has previously been 
stated, the logic of consequentiality (i.e. do A, in response, you will get B) was largely 
dominating the European project. As the Community expanded through inclusion of 
new member states, the logic of appropriateness (i.e. do A; in view of the fact that, it is 
the right thing to do) started to reveal itself as the new engine of the European project. 
Respectively, inclusion of Greece, Spain and Portugal into the Community throughout 
the 80s paved the way for political integration in which logic of appropriateness began 
to grow stronger vis-à-vis the logic of consequentiality. In particular, by means of the 
deep integration process which was commenced right after the Maastricht Treaty of 
1991, today’s European Union began to be shaped. Political aspects came to the fore 
front in the integration project together with the material considerations. This new 
structuring of the EU has inevitably impacted the course of Turkey-EU relations. In 
many occasions, ‘Turkey’s shortcomings in its democracy, and poor human right 
records’ were reiterated by European political elites. Until the December 2004, the main 
concern of the EU was about the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria by the Turkish 
government. “There was little need to refer to historical/cultural/religious arguments 
about whether Turkey could ever be ‘European’; it was enough to note that on strictly 
political grounds, Turkey was not yet ‘European’ enough.”131  
Nonetheless, as the Turkish membership to the EU became apparently visible in 
both the elite and societal levels in Europe, process of reconsideration of the scope of 
European integration started. Post-October 2005 era is merely a representation of such 
attitudes among Europeans with respect to the Turkish membership. As a matter of fact, 
with the opening the accession talks, Europeans bitterly felt the necessity of “rethinking 
about the parameters of the European project or the identity or purpose of the European 
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UTILITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS-LIKELY IMPACTS OF TURKEY’S 
 





To put the Turkish membership in the broadest possible context, after having 
presented the historical and empirical analysis of Turkey-EU relations, it is timely to 
discuss over the likely impacts of the Turkish accession to the EU. In other words, 
utilitarian considerations are aimed to be analyzed. These considerations can be 








“It is not symbolic geography that creates politics, but rather the reverse… ‘Europe’ 
ends where politicians want it to end.” 133 
                                                                                                              Maria Todorova 
 
Since the commencement of accession talks with Turkey on 3 October 2005, 
discussions on the likely impact of Turkish membership to the EU have increased in 
numbers in both the EU circles and the individual member states. Beyond doubt, 
geopolitical and strategic considerations have always been one of the most conspicuous 
and significant assets of Turkey in those discussions. Therefore, one has to inevitably 
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discuss the likely impacts of the prospective Turkish membership to the EU from the 
lenses of geopolitics and security. It has to be remembered that the operating 
assumption at the heart of the discussion is that ‘the EU is willing and aiming to be a 
global power’. The capability of the EU as an international actor on the global stage is 
out of the scope of the discussion.134  In other words, the inclusion of Turkey into the 
EU is a means to strengthen the EU’s aim to be a global power on condition that Turkey 
and the EU are both able and willing to find a common denominator in shaping their 
needs and preferences while walking towards a common and consistent future. Drawing 
from the same line of reasoning, it is relevant to discuss the likely impacts of Turkish 




 3.1.2. Foreign policy and security dimension 
 
 
Turkey’s geopolitical significance has always been a substantial asset in the 
positioning of Turkey in the international arena. It has always been important for the 
Americans. The Cold War is the best possible international phenomenon in which 
Turkey’s geostrategic importance reached its apex. It is worth to remind that Turkey has 
been a reliable member of the NATO throughout the Cold War. With regard to Turkey’s 
place in Western security circle; and, especially its position in the NATO, subsequent 
arguments over Turkey are worth considering: 
   “First, [Turkey] may be seen as a forward position for Western 
security interests, extending NATO power into the Middle East, the 
Caucasus, and Central Asia. In this mode, Turkey’s eastern military 
bases and borders reaches form a strategic frontier for its allies to 
project military presence well into the Russian sphere of influence 
and the strategic energy zone around the Persian Gulf states.”135  
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Second, through “[a]n emphasis on energy transport and new geostrategic interests 
among” the US and the EU, “Turkey serves as a bridge into that same region”.136 
Drawing from the same ‘bridge’ metaphor in reference to issues of foreign policy, it is 
contextually apt  to state that “[T]urkey provides a diplomatic bridge between European 
and US interests, at one end, and the Muslims states of the Persian Gulf and the Turkic 
peoples of Central Asia, on the other.”137 
The foregoing discussion fairly represents the geopolitical significance of Turkey. 
Precisely like their American counterparts, Europeans are also aware of the uniqueness 
and peculiarity of Turkey’s geopolitical and strategic positioning in its region. As the 
likelihood of Turkish membership turn into a reality, the EU’s awareness and attention to 
the significance of Turkish geopolitical location have increased. An American type of 
awareness in matters of security and geopolitics regarding Turkey can also be found in 
the EU circles. See, for example, the following sentences extracted from the 
Commission’s Staff Working Document on Turkey, in which Turkey’s geopolitical 
significance for the EU is clearly highlighted:  
 
   “Turkey is situated at a regional crossroads of strategic importance 
for Europe: the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East and 
Eastern Mediterranean; its territory is a transit route for land and air 
transport with Asia, and for sea transport with Russia and Ukraine. Its 
neighbors provide key energy supplies for Europe, and it has 
substantial water resources.” 138 
 
As the aforementioned lines demonstrate, Turkey is positioned in a strategically 
important region. The prospective Turkish membership to the EU implies the direct 
extension of the EU borders to the regions like the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle 
East, the Balkans and the Central Asia. Though those areas are not the safest, securest 
and most stable regions of the world (both economically and politically), there are a lot 
to be gained for the EU by making use of Turkey’s past historical experiences with the 
states in those regions. In other words, if the EU wants to construct a better relationship 
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framework with the non-EU states in those regions, the Union should be aware of the 
potential that is carried along through the entrance of new comers into the EU. That is to 
say, the EU should “[m]ake use of the commonalities that exist between some member 
states and some neighboring countries…this is especially true in the case of Turkey and 
its neighbors.”139 
When framed as such, it is possible to argue that Turkish membership poses a set 
of challenges and opportunities. So long as the two sides insist on a common and 
consistent future, at the overall, plusses arising from the Turkish membership surmount 
the negatives. In view of the fact that ‘Turkey is an asset -rather than a liability- for the 
future of EU’s foreign policy’, one framework created by Michael Emerson and Nathalie 
Tocci from CEPS, in which the arguments advocated by Prime Minister Erdogan are put 
into context, is chosen to be the most relevant framework, which have the capability of 
being in harmony of the scope of this section.140 
 
Table 4: Objective Factors Demonstrating Turkish Potential Contribution to the 
EU’s Foreign and Security Policy: 
 
1. Turkey’s accession would lead to an extended reach of the European 
Neighborhood Policy.141 Turkey’s neighbors would become direct neighbors of 
the EU. 
2. Turkey has the role of a geographical hub for regional cooperation. 
3. Turkey is a secure energy-transport hub for Caspian, Middle Eastern and Russian 
oil and gas. 
4. Turkey is well situated to become a forward base for the EU’s security and 
defense policy, for military logistics and the credibility of the EU’s presence in 
the region. 
5. Turkey has valuable human resources to complement those of the EU for 
cooperation programs, ranging from business know-how to language skills. 
Source: Emerson and Tocci, 2004, p. 9. 
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Nonetheless, though there are deep cleavages among the individual member states 
of the EU on the common foreign and security policy due to the events of 9/11 and the 
War on Iraq, the extension of the EU borders via Turkish membership to the regions like 
Syria, Iran, Iraq will inevitably push member states to better cooperate on foreign 
policy.142 In other words, in the next decade -though still depending on how much the 
EU is willing to demonstrate itself as a foreign actor in its neighborhood- it is possible to 
see a “[r]ebalancing of the Union’s focus towards its southern and south-eastern 
neighborhood.”143 Therefore, both for the EU’s internal security and its credibility as a 
foreign policy actor in its neighborhood, Turkey’s accession is an appropriate means to 
accelerate the construction of the EU’s foreign policy. 
Another dimension of the debate is the security. In this context, Turkey as an 
experienced NATO member and having significant military assets, subsequent to its 
cultural and technical links with the Middle East and Southern Caucasus, may well 
contribute the security and defense of the EU provided that these assets are incorporated 
with that of the EU.144 Also, Turkey may also contribute the EU in the issue areas 
associated with the soft threats to the EU like illegal trafficking of drugs and humans, 
fundamental terrorism.145 There are clear evidences backing up this argument. In order to 
illustrate what has been stated, see the following data 
 
“Turkey spends 2.4% of its GDP on military expenditure, compared 
with an average of 2% for the rest of NATO’s European members. 
Turkey’s military forces are by far the largest in NATO’s European 
contingent by number of personnel, accounting for a quarter of the 
total, with 514,000 enrolled (but with a large number of conscripts-
391,000)…Turkey has also a substantial gendarmerie of 150,000, 
some of whom are effectively elite military troops. More specifically, 
Turkey has a significant cadre of career NCOs, with considerable 
combat experience in difficult terrains.”146 
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Having discussed the potential benefits/opportunities arising from the Turkish 
accession; however, there are also some challenging and somewhat controversial issues 
with regard to the Turkish case. According to some critics, no matter how convergent 
may be the Turkish and EU foreign policy interests in the previously mentioned regions, 
there is still a possibility that Turkey may “[f]ollow the footsteps of the American 
policies” due the fact that Turkey and the US have  a strong bilateral relationship for 
more than fifty years.147 However, “rejection of the temporary deployment of 62000 US 
troops in Turkish soil by the parliament on 1 March 2003” in the War on Iraq, changed 
Turkish-American relations directions and surprised many Europeans, Americans and as 
well as Turks themselves.148 Plus, “[i]t has also brought Turkey’s foreign policy closer to 
the underlying ideology of European foreign policy, even is the EU has itself been so 
deeply split over Iraq.”149 In other words, labeling Turkey as the ‘Trojan Horse of the US 
in the EU’ is bit of an overstatement. Besides, the CEECs are also known with their pro-
American stance especially with regard to the issue areas in the security field. 
In addition, some observers have pointed out that Turkey might be a strong bridge 
between the EU and the Middle East. But it has to be noted that though Turkey will serve 
as a bridge in many aspects, waiting Turkey to be a stronger player in the political realm 
between these two worlds is somewhat naïve. Rather than a strong bridge, it is better to 
see Turkey “as an interpreter or translator for the EU with the Middle East but to an 
extent that should not be exaggerated and that will vary by country.”150 
One final point is associated with the traditional security discourse of Turkey. In 
order for Turkey to adopt itself the changing security discourse imposed by globalization 
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in general and the EU in particular, Turkish should transform its traditional Republican 
rhetoric with a new one. “The traditional discourse on security in Turkey has been that of 
the civilian-military bureaucratic elite since the foundation of the Republic.”151 In other 
words, “[f]ear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory”, plus the “assumption of 
geographical determinism has characterized the Republican era.”152 This is however not 
to suggest that this traditional discourse throughout all those years remained unchanged. 
In line with the requirements of the circumstances in both the domestic and foreign 
policy, the national security understanding in Turkey has gone under severe scrutiny 
since the 1999 EU Helsinki decision to give Turkey an official candidate status. “The 
constitutional reforms and ensuing harmonization packages since October 2001 
constitute indisputable evidence of change in Turkey.”153 Though Euro-skeptics still 
firmly stick to the traditional discourse of national security, pro-EU actors are aware of 
the fact that some sort of a brand new approach (without necessarily ignoring the old one 
in its entirety) in national security understanding is necessary in order for Turkey to 
mould its national preferences into a common future with the EU. 
To recapitulate, as Bilgin has argued “[t]he pro-EU actors have made a beginning 
by opening up Turkey’s definition of Turkey’s ‘national security’ for debate and sowing 
the seeds of an alternative discourse on security.”154 Despite the recent developments 
such as the increase in the numbers of the civilian in the National Security Council, and 
the decrease in the centrality of military in the Turkish politics, there are still much to be 
done. That is to say, “[f]or Turkey’s security discourse to change further, civil societal 
actors and politicians would need to develop an interest in, and knowledge of, issues to 
do with security.”155 By doing as such, it is possible to find a better ground for 
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Many Europeans fear that Turkey’s accession will be too costly for the EU because 
they think that Turkey is ‘too poor’ and ‘too big’. They also believe that the volatile and 
backward nature of the Turkish economy will worsen the already bitterly struggling 
economies of Europe. In addition, there is also a possibility for Europeans to lose their 
jobs since they believe that the Turkish membership will presumably cause huge waves 
of immigration from Turkey to the core EU member states. In order to contemplate over 
these considerations, it is timely to look at the Table 5 in which main features of Turkey 
and the EU are given in a comparative perspective:  
Table 5: Some Facts about Turkey and the EU in a Comparative Perspective 
 
 TURKEY EUROPEAN UNION 
Population 70,413,958  456,953,258  
Age Structure 
 
0-14 years: 25.5%, 
15-64 years: 67.7 % 
65 years and over: 6.8%  
 
0-14 years: 16.03%, 
15-64 years: 67.17 % 
65 years and over: 16.81%  
Population Growth 
Rate 1.06% 0.15%  
Life Expectancy  
at birth 72.62 years 78.3 years 
GDP (PPP) $572 billion (2005 est.) $12.18 trillion (2005 est.) 
GDP-real growth rate 5.6% (2005 est.) 1.7% (2005 est.) 
GDP-per capita (PPP) $8,200 (2005 est.) $28,100 (2005 est.) 
 
GDP- composition by 
sector 
Agriculture: 11.7% 









Note: about 1.2 million Turks 
work abroad (2005 est.) 
 













Unemployment Rate 10.2 plus Underemployment of 4% (2005 est.) 
9.4% (2005 est.) 
 
Source: Data compiled from the CIA, The World Factbook 2006.156 
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As seen from the figures above Turkey can be regarded as a middle income 
country. In terms of demographics, it is nearly 15.5% of the EU-25. Drawing from these 
two facts, “opponents to Turkish accession suggest that Turkey will be both too powerful 
and too costly in budget terms to join the EU”.157 
Nonetheless, it has to be remembered that “size per se is not a criteria for EU 
accession but potential impact of size on the Union is an important and relevant factor in 
managing accession”.158 On the other hand, “with a population of 70 million, Turkey, 
would in terms of today’s population figures, become the second largest member of the 
EU. However, the population of Turkey is relatively young, and it is likely to exceed 
Germany’s 82 million by 2020, if not earlier”.159 However, the earliest date for accession 
is 2015 if everything goes on the right track between the EU and Turkey. Also, “at a 
political level, the fact that Turkey is a small economic player will reduce its political 
clout on economic policy issues.”160 Not surprisingly, the most powerful economic 
players in the EU are also the most powerful political players in the EU: Germany, 
France, UK and Italy are in this category. Simply, “political and economic dominance go 
together. This is not the case for Turkey”.161 
As is evidenced from the statistical data given at the beginning of the discussion, 
possible implications of the Turkish membership on the EU should be evaluated by its 
size, GDP per head, and its dependence on agriculture. These factors are all reflected in 
the huge income disparities across Turkey. Since Turkey is a lower middle income 
country, 
   “[a]ccession of Turkey…would increase regional economic 
disparities in the enlarged EU in a similar way to the most recent 
enlargement, and would represent a major challenge for cohesion 
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policy. Turkey would qualify for significant support from the 
structural and cohesion funds over a long period of time.”162 
 
Furthermore, “Turkey’s relatively low level of development is [also] evident in the 
share of the labor force in agriculture”.163 For the EU, if all these factors are combined 
together; if immigration is let free there is a high possibility of large-scale migration to 
the core countries of Europe. “The prospect of large-scale immigration is a source of 
considerable concern among the EU15; they fear immigrants will depress wages, boost 
unemployment, and cause social frictions and political upheavals”.164 Nonetheless, 
drawing from the previous enlargements experiences in the 1980s and the latest one in 
2004 it has to be reminded that “old member countries were allowed to restrict 
immigration for a period of seven years. It can therefore be safely assumed that 
immigration from Turkey will be subject to restrictions for several years.”165 
As for trade, the prospect of Turkey’s accession is not assumed to alter the pattern 
of trade between the EU and Turkey in view of the fact that Turkey has already been in 
the Customs Union since the late 1990s. Nonetheless, “the volume of trade could 
increase considerably” among the two parties.166 By the by, the Customs Union is one of 
the most interesting aspects of the Turkey-EU relations.  Turkey is the first country in the 
history of the Union which entered into the Customs Union without being a full member 
of the EU. Therefore, it is fair to say that “some integration effects are already visible in 
the context of the EU-Turkey Customs Union. Accession itself can provide a further 
boost to economic growth and prosperity in Turkey, as well as a positive, but much 
smaller, impact on the present EU Member States.”167 One possible scenario with regard 
to Turkey’s growth potential might be framed as following. If the annual growth rate of 
Turkey and EU-25 can be stabilized at an average rate of 5% and 2% respectively, “the 
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Turkish economy by 2015 would only be 2.9% of EU-25 GDP.”168 As mentioned 
previously, this scenario is again a reflection of the projection that “Turkey’s impact on 
the Union and the internal market is likely to be marginal for the Union, though it could 
be highly positive for Turkey itself.”169 
Despite this positive outlook, some commentators argue that Turkey is still lacking 
behind the ten new members of the EU. This is true that Turkey’s population is more 
than the sum of the ten members’ population and Turkey is still growing in concrete 
numbers as opposed to the current situation in the EU-25. Apart form that, Turkey is not 
that much different from the previous candidates.  
   “The average GDP per head is less than 30 percent of the EU-25 
average while that in the new members in Central and East Europe is 
closer to 50 percent. But it is unfair to compare Turkey, which is at the 
start of the journey, with the new members that have already arrived. 
Ten years before accession, Poland’s GDP per head stood at 35 percent 
of the EU average, and that of the Romania was much lower still.” 170    
 
As for the issue of foreign direct investments, Turkey is far behind the ten new 
members. Considerable degree of FDI have entered into those countries “as a result of 
large investments by firms from Western Europe and elsewhere, which combine their 
technical, managerial, and marketing assets with a generally well-educated and skilled 
labor force at low wages”171 and “the privatization of state-owned companies.”172 
Looking at Turkey from here, “Turkey has a long way to go before it can hope to attract 
the same level of foreign direct investment as some of the more successful countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe.”173 Nonetheless, it is fair to say that “the perspective of EU 
membership triggers substantial FDI by EU companies due to the simple fact that the 
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implementation of the acquis and of the institutional framework of the EU boosts 
investors’ confidence to explore new market opportunities.”174 
Another characteristic of the Turkish economy is its growing population of 
working age, i.e. demographic dynamism.175 In contrast to the situation in many CEECs, 
“labor force will continue to increase in the long-run and this huge discrepancy gives 
Turkey potentially much more dynamism and leeway for growth.”176 In other words, 
“the share of young people will remain quite high when compared to the EU and 
candidate countries. This demographic structure presents both a window of opportunity 
for the Turkish economy, but also a heavy burden, especially on the educational and 
training system.”177 
With regard to likely migration flows from Turkey to the EU, it is not yet possible 
to predict the outcome. It will be shaped ceteris paribus by the level of income and 
unemployment and existing employment opportunities at the two sides.178 As has already 
been stated, Turkey will not receive a different treatment from the 2004 entrants. There 
will also be a transition period for the case of Turkey.179 In other words, “[a]ppropriate 
transitional provisions and a permanent safeguard clause could be considered to avoid 
serious disturbances on the EU labor market.”180 At this stage, Ansgar Belke offers a 
highly optimistic scenario regarding the Turkish case. See the following words of Belke; 
   “[A]t that time a new scenario will prevail. First, due to population 
ageing, not only the EU-15 [the ones who pushed the button for 
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restriction on the free movement of labor] will suffer shortages 
instead of unemployment. Second, due to income convergence, 
emigration will not appear as worthwhile as before to Turkish 
workers. Seen on the whole, the current public debate on how large 
Turkish emigration flows will actually be, seem to be exaggerated 
and misplaced.”181  
 
The final issue regarding the implications of the Turkish accession to the EU is the 
cost of the enlargement, that is to say the budgetary effects of Turkey’s membership to 
the Union. First of all, it is impossible to give a precise number as to how much Turkey’s 
membership will cost the EU budget in view of the fact that both the Turkish and 
European economies are subject to constant change. First, Turkey’s membership will not 
take place before 2015. Second, the context and guiding rules of the financial perspective 
of 2014 onwards are not yet known. Third, it is almost impossible to predict what 
direction the EU budget and major policies like CAP or regional policy will take by the 
year 2015 and beyond.182 In light of these uncertainties, making long term forecasts 
about the cost of Turkish membership to the EU is thus highly speculative. Incidentally, 
it is worth to remind that the determinants of the cost of Turkey’s membership are the 
‘structural funds and CAP receipts’ that Turkey will get when full membership is 
assured.183 To give a rough approximation as to how much Turkish membership will cost 
the EU budget; the following forecast done by Dervis, Gros, Oztrak, and Isik, with the 
collaboration of Bayar will be presented. In this forecast, Turkey’s membership is not 
assumed to take place before 2015. In other words, the forecast takes the year 2015 as 
the earliest date for the Turkish entrance into the EU. In view of the fact that Turkey is a 
lower middle income country and contains huge income disparities among its regions, 
components of the possible cost of the Turkish membership are assumed to be consisting 
of structural funds (arising from the cohesion policy of the EU) and the CAP receipts 
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(arising from the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU). To see the overall picture, see 
the Table 6 given below:184 
 
Table 6: Possible Cost of Turkish Membership to the EU Budget 
 
 
Turkey in Today’s EU 
(in billions of current 
euros) 
Turkey 2015 in enlarged 
EU (as a % of EU GDP) 
Structural Funds 8 0.16 








(Max) Net receipts 
For Turkey 
16 (0.16% of EU GDP) 0.20 
Source:  K. Dervis, D. Gros, F. Oztrak, and Y. Isik in cooperation with F. Bayar. 
 
 
Although elaborated numbers may as well change during the course of time, this 
sort of estimation is appropriate - at least to some extent- to give an overall idea (albeit 
an approximation) as to how much Turkey’s membership will cost the EU? Under the 
assumption that current rules for contributions and receipts are still valid; plus, the CAP 
it self, “the ceiling for the net cost should thus be around 0.20 % of EU GDP (equivalent 
to about €20 billion given today’s EU GDP of around €10.000 billion.”185 
To sum up, although estimated numbers may seem to constitute a considerable 
amount; on the other hand, when compared with the national economies of Europe or the 
whole EU economy, these sums constitute important but manageable amount for the EU 
budget.186 Above all, one condition will always have to exist for the sake of the Turkish 
economy itself and the likelihood of accession process to proceed: continuity in the 
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democratic and economic reform processes which have already engendered significant 
improvements and stability in both the political and economic realms. 
 
 




Throughout the entire chapter, likely impacts of Turkish membership to the EU 
have been analyzed. Two points have been central in the context of Turkey’s 
membership to the EU: (i) geopolitical and strategic considerations; (ii) economic 
considerations. These two points are assumed to represent the utilitarian considerations. 
Inevitably, logic of consequentiality has been the principal logic behind the entire 
chapter. Throughout the chapter, Turkey’s potential contribution to the EU has been 
explained. As has already been stated, “[f]ollowing the logic of consequentiality implies 
to treat possible rules and interpretations as alternatives in a rational choice problem.”187 
If it is the case, acting on the basis of logic of consequentiality resembles something like 
this: 
   “To act on the basis of logic of consequentiality or anticipatory 
action includes the following steps: a. What are my alternatives? b. 
What are my values? c. What are the consequences of my alternatives 
for my values? d. Choose the alternative that has the best expected 
consequences. To act in conformity with rules that constrain conduct 
is then based on rational calculation and contracts, and is motivated 
by incentives and personal advantage.”188 
 
When applied to the institutional perspective; logic of consequentiality, in context 
of the Turkish membership to the EU, produces the results that are presented throughout 
this chapter. With the aim of getting the broadest possible overall picture as regards to 
the potential contribution of Turkey’s accession to the EU’s foreign and security policy, 
main findings of this chapter have to be revisited. This is to be done through reminding 
of the Commission’s point of view in this issue, which also coincides with the overall 
argument of the section on geopolitical and strategic considerations in this chapter. See 
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the following lines which are extracted from the Commission’s Staff Working Document 
of 2004:  
 
   “Turkey is a strategically important country whose EU membership 
would implications for foreign policy in a number of potentially 
unstable neighboring regions such as the Mediterranean, the Middle 
East, Caucasus and Central Asia… If Turkey pursues its economic 
modernization, socio-economic development and regional 
integration, it would be able to play an important stabilizing in its 
neighborhood. As an EU member Turkey would have importance for 
a number of trans-national issues (energy, water resources, transport, 
border management, counter-terrorism).With its large military 
expenditure and manpower, Turkey has the material capacity to make 
a significant contribution to EU security and defense policy. On 
international issues, Turkey generally aligns its positions to the EU’s 
common foreign and security policy; but on some sensitive issues 
(human rights, the Middle East) this is not yet the case…  However, 
in the future development of Turkish foreign policy, much will 
depend on internal developments within Turkey, especially as regards 
the future role of the military, religion, and civil society.”189  
  
From the findings of this chapter as regards to geopolitical and strategic 
considerations, it is possible to claim that Turkey’s accession “could give a synergetic 
boost to the EU’s capability and credibility as a foreign policy actor across the EU’s 
southern and eastern neighborhoods.”190 
As for the economic dimension of the debate, the section on economic 
considerations aims to present a qualitative and to a certain extent quantitative 
assessment on how Turkey’s accession would impact the EU. In order to review the 
general findings of the section, see the following lines extracted from the Commission 
Staff Working Document of 2004: 
 “Overall, EU Member States’ economies would benefit from the 
accession of Turkey, albeit only slightly. An acceleration of growth in 
Turkey should give a positive impulse to EU-25 exports…A possible 
increase in labor supply, stemming from migration from Turkey, could 
contribute to some additional growth. Taking into account the low 
income levels of Turkish regions as compared to the EU average, 
Turkey’s accession would statistically increase regional disparities in 
the EU. Turkey would benefit substantially from its accession to the 
EU. Accession should boost Turkey’s growth essentially via increased 
trade, higher investment due to higher FDI inflows, and higher 
productivity growth to a shift in the sectoral composition of output and 
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the implementation of structural reforms in line with the competitive 
EU internal market…In order for Turkey to fully benefit from 
accession, macroeconomic and financial stability must be ensured and 
its productive capacity enhanced by appropriate increases in physical 
and human capital.”191 
 
In sum, though Turkey is a populous and economically poor country, “the 
economic outlook for Turkey is rather promising and…the accession negotiations might 
be self-enforcing.”192 In addition, Turkey is a young and dynamic economy. Main 
obstacle in front of the Turkish economy is to make its latest macroeconomic 
stabilization sustainable.193 Nonetheless, the sustainability of democratic reforms is also 
crucial for the negotiations with the EU. “The EU monitoring will help Turkey to spot 
problems and set priorities…But the main responsibility for sorting out the Turkish 
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Since the 2004 Brussels European Council Meeting, in which the decision on the 
formal opening of negotiations between Turkey and the EU was taken, “opponents to 
enlargement have invoked a supposed historical and cultural identity, especially with 
regard to Turkey.”195 Turkish accession to the EU has thus become quite apparent in  
both the political elite level and the societal level in Europe. It is at this stage in which 
cultural, ideational, and religious factors come into the scene. Prior to this stage, 
objections to the Turkish membership were primarily based on economic and political 
considerations. Debates as regards to Turkey’s Europeanness were not yet on the table 
of the EU.  As has been clearly stated by Ziya Onis, 
 
   “European approach to Turkish-EU relations was that Turkey was 
economically backward and, at the same time, had failed to satisfy 
the criteria in relation to democratization and human rights necessary 
to qualify for full membership in the foreseeable future.”196 
 
However, when the EU decided to open the accession talks with Turkey in view 
of the fact that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria, debates “concerning the 
various dimensions of European identity and the boundaries of and the ambiguities 
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surrounding the European project” has sharply increased in number.197 “Turkish 
accession to the EU has [thus far] become one of the most politically contentious issues 
in Europe”.198 Almost every political party in Europe has a stance on this issue. 
Nonetheless, it is worth to point out the fact that debates over Turkey, “and the broader 
issues surrounding membership, reveal much about what Europeans hope the ‘New 
Europe’ will become”.199  
 




 It is a universally acknowledged truth that being European does not only refer to 
living in a particular region of the world- i.e. Europe- but also refers to sharing and 
practicing of a common history, norms, traditions and values. By the same token, it is 
no surprise that current twenty-five members of the EU are key players in creating the 
concept of Europeanness. Those states share a common understanding of the past along 
with a common heritage. For so many times in history, economic and social practices 
made them closer; but, at the same time cultural and historical specificities made them 
foes and rivals. In this common heritage, Europeans have witnessed several important 
events such as the Reformation, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the 
industrialization, the birth of nation-state and democracy. Aforementioned events were 
not only ‘essential’ and ‘revolutionary’ per se in the history of Europe but also crucial 
and constitutive in the world history. 
To begin with, Europe is a geographical region which gave birth to construction 
of a particular civilization. In the formation and construction of this civilization, the 
Roman Empire and Christianity played constitutive and unifying roles in binding the 
peoples of Europe together. Despite the fact that the Reformation might have broken the 
seemingly harmonious state of unity in religion; however, Christianity has never ceased 
to serve for the greater good of the European intellect.200 Subsequently, Enlightenment 
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with its emphasis on rationality and individualism engendered an unprecedented process 
of development in Europe in science and technology. In other words, the Enlightenment 
and modernization went hand in hand. As time went by, the peoples of Europe-albeit 
experiencing the Enlightenment and modernization in different times- witnessed “the 
transformation of rural, subsistence economies and feudal patriarchal political systems 
into industrialized democratic systems.”201 In a very broader sense, at the risk of 
oversimplification, the European Union as we know it today can be viewed as the latest 
product of the peoples of Europe. 
While all those revolutionary events were taking place in the heart of Europe, 
European way of thinking and doing things started to affect the non-European world. 
Modernization, which is oft-identified with Europe, thus started to spill over to the rest 
of the world. That is to say, “historical points of convergence, common experiences and 
the development of a particular appraisal of the world, humanity and life itself went 
beyond underlying cultural and ethnic differences”.202 While mentioning the 
convergence of particular experiences, values and traditions, it is also worthwhile to 
remember the simple fact that differences, rivalries, enmities throughout all European 
history have to a certain degree been instrumental in shaping the political and cultural 
map of Europe. At this point, Jewish, Arabic and Ottoman influences are worth 
mentioning in Europe’s search for the ‘other’. Following the same line of reasoning, it 
is thus reasonable to interpret European history and Europe as an end result of the 
interplay of the commonalities and differences engendered by Europeans themselves as 
well as non-Europeans. These diverging and converging points gave birth to the genesis 
and continuity of European thought and culture. At this stage, it is wise to acknowledge 
that Europe has performed remarkably well in changing the circumstance in its favor. 
As regards to Europe’s success in transforming the circumstances in its favor, Agnes 
Heller points out the fact that “Europe takes the other, transforms it and makes it 
own.”203 In accordance with the idea of a ‘unified and integrated Europe’, it is possible 
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to argue that the very existence of external threat and the urgent need to defend 
themselves against the threat compelled Europeans to think and act in harmony.204 For 
most of the time, the source of the threat was the East: (i) Arabic invasions to the 
Iberian Peninsula; (ii) Ottomans march to the doors of the Central Europe; (iii) the 
hegemony of the Soviet Union in the Eastern Europe.205 Europe’s other has always been 
subject to change according to evolving nature of the European circumstances. In other 
words, “[t]he importance of external recognition varies, but at its most extreme it is a 
crucial determining factor in the creation of identities.”206 As David McCrone points out 
“nor are national cultures and identities fixed and immutable. They are subject to 
processes of translation and change.”207 The same point of view has also been 
advocated by Mayer and Palmowski. In a similar fashion, they argue that “[i]dentities 
are constructed and mediated constantly, and they require acceptance both within and 
from without.”208 Accordingly, the same logic can also be applied to the formation of 
the European identity. As mentioned earlier, it is still under construction and subject to 
constant change. Thus the particular conception of Europe should not only be 
constructed on the basis of a common reading of the past and homogeneous culture. 
Despite the fact that, ‘others of the Europe’ have played a significant role in 
construction of the self-definition of Europe, it is better to remind that being European 
is also defined through “forgetting as much as remembering”.209  
As of today, European identity does not seem to be prevailing over the national 
identities. That is to say, national identities are still at the fore front and do not appear to 
be eroding in favor of the newly emerging European one. In this context, European 
identity is a new layer of self-identification, added on top of national identities without 
necessarily challenging them. The latest debates indicate that there is no actual trade-off 
between the national and European identities. In this sense, as Hooghe and Marks point 
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out, there is a positive correlation between attachment to one’s own country and support 
for European integration.210 By the same token, Bruter claims that the more an 
individual defines oneself with his/her nationality, the more he/she associates 
himself/herself with Europeanness.211 
One final point still demands an urgent attention. It is a well-known fact that 
“[i]dentification with the European continent has always been linked to the continent’s 
history, geography and culture. However, the current, particular …meanings of a 
European identity have been reshaped, expressed and amplified through the process of 
European integration since the 1950s.”212 It is actually the case because the supra-level 
European identity revolves around the EU. Therefore, the roots of the European 
identity, as we know it today, can be traced in the political and legal aspects of the EU. 
“[T]he EU can at most be characterized by an attempt to build civility codes of 
identities by reutilizing new practices and rituals in a European sphere of 
communication and identification with key values and institutions.”213 In accordance 
with Bartolini’s point that only the acquired rights and traits can be the base of 
Europeanness; and, thus, the fundamental elements of European identity are declared in 
the Document on the European Identity is to be a society which measures up to the 
needs of the individual representative democracy, rule of law, social justice and respect 
for human rights.214 In other words, European identity should be inclusive in the sense 
that “[t]he factors that make the difference between being European and not-on the 
margins of Europe- involve sharing a particular set of values, socio-economic 
development and societal organization.”215 Therefore, “[c]ommon understandings, 
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values, norms and interests will constitute the basis of liberal community” in which the 
peoples of Europe live.216 
Having touched upon the European identity, it is relevant to discuss the identity 
debate with regard to enlargement. As already stated, becoming a member of the EU 
implies being a part of the European integration process through the sharing of burdens 
and benefits emanating from the membership. Accordingly, while deciding on decision 
to expand, the EU sets its own agenda and more than that its own priorities. Thus 
countries excluded from the successive enlargement rounds will be the ones whose 
Europeanness is not acknowledged or in question. What is significant and clear is that 
“the European collective identity promoted by the EU is hybrid in terms of embodying 
both inclusive and exclusive aspects.”217 Therefore the newly-emerging- political map 
of Europe will set the demarcation line between the Europeans (i.e. insiders) and non-
Europeans (i.e. outsiders).  
In this critical juncture, Turkish membership to the EU has to be analyzed through 
the lenses of identity and culture so as to shed light onto the ongoing debate on 
Turkey’s Europeanness and Europeans willingness to embrace Turkey as a new member 
in the EU. 
 
 




For a very long time Turkey has been in a close relationship with Europe. 
Nonetheless, despite the existence of long years of relationship with Europe, Turkey’s 
Europeanness has always been a controversial issue. Needless to say, Turkey’s own 
internal ambiguities regarding its identity and Europe’s own confusion in shaping its 
newly emerging identity have made the things worse. Regarding the Turkish case, it is 
possible to argue that the past still casts shadows over the present tense. That is to say, 
the Ottoman Empire and its Muslim identity as opposed to Christian Europe have been 
crucial in shaping the minds of Europeans in conjunction with the Turkish membership 
to the EU. In particular, when one starts considering the civilizational dimension of the 
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European integration project, ideational and religious factors inevitably come to the fore 
front. Not surprisingly, the demarcation lines between the insiders and outsiders start 
growing bolder. In the context of contemporary Europe’s self definition and the other; 
according to Ziya Onis, “Christianity is a key component of European identity, even 
though it may not be its principal or overriding constituent.”218 He goes further and 
argues that “[i]n the EU’s relations with Turkey, this dimension of the European 
identity comes to the surface and plays a major determinant role.”219  
Having said that “Christian-Muslim divide is …a central line of demarcation 
between Turkey and contemporary Europe”, it is relevant to goes back in history to find 
the traces of this demarcation.220As has also been stated by Mayer and Palmowski, it is 
worth to look back at history in the sense that “[w]ith the current wave of enlargement, 
a European identity has largely been constructed on historic grounds.”221 In this context, 
it is possible to argue that “for more than 500 years Europe defined itself partially in 
opposition to the Ottoman Empire, asserting an historic identity for Europe would have 
profound implications for the question of Turkish accession.”222 The first meeting of 
Europeans with Muslim civilization can be assumed to take place in battles at 
Tours/Poitiers in the eight century. Some two hundred years later -through the crusades- 
confrontation of Christians with the Muslims started growing tense and violent. Finally, 
with the second siege of Vienna in 1683, this confrontation reached its climax. 
Therefore, these historical experiences of Europeans with the Muslim world still have 
contemporary influence in the minds and hearts of the peoples of Europe.223 In this 
sense, the Ottoman Empire was obviously a critical player in European politics; 
however, for most of the time, the Ottomans’ confrontations with Europe were always 
almost hostile and violent. In addition, the Ottomans did not exert themselves too much 
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to develop more substantial and closer ties with Europeans in the areas like culture, 
economics or even in diplomacy.224 According to Mayer and Palmowski, 
 
   “[i]t is through interaction with each other and with outsiders that 
individual and group identities are constructed. Certain base co-
ordinates such as geographic and familial origin are given, but they 
obtain their individual meanings through the emotional content 
gained in interaction with others.”225 
 
The emotional content in the EU-Turkey relations were already existent in 
conjunction with the Ottoman past of the Turks. As already mentioned “[e]vents such as 
two Ottoman sieges of Vienna did much to imprint a view of the Turks on Europeans, 
so that in Said’s terms, Turks (and Muslims more generally) were defined as ‘the other’ 
by Europeans and imbued with a host of negative traits (for example, ‘uncivilized’, 
‘barbaric’, ‘heathen’).”226 
As of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans became the ‘sick man of Europe’ and 
World War One brought the collapse of the Empire. Nonetheless, hostile confrontations 
of the Ottomans with the Christian community in the Balkan Wars and the massacre of 
Armenians in World War One did nothing but to make the Ottomans’ image worse in 
the eyes of the Europeans and to a great extent strengthened the prejudices against the 
Ottomans with regard to their ‘savagery’. When one follows the traces of the past, it is 
no hard for him to find ‘hostile sentiments’ against the Ottomans among the Europeans. 
Here is a simple manifestation of one of those ‘hostile’ sentiments against the 
Ottomans:  
   “The primary and most essential factor in the situation is the 
presence, embedded in the living flesh of Europe, of an alien 
substance. That substance is the Ottoman Turk. Akin to the European 
family neither in creed, in race, in language, in social customs, nor in 
political aptitudes and traditions, the Ottomans have for more than 
five hundred years presented to the European powers a problem, now 
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tragic, now comic, now bordering almost on burlesque, but always 
baffling and paradoxical.”227 
 
Having said that the First World War brought the end of the Ottoman Empire, it is 
worthwhile to mention that a new nation-state was come into being after the demise of 
the Empire. This process of nation-building was accomplished through the War of 
Independence under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal against the Allied Forces. The 
ultimate result of this war was the establishment of a new state, i.e. the Republic of 
Turkey, in 1923. After having discussed that the Ottoman past of Turkey still casts 
shadows over its present day relations with Europe, it is timely to discuss the 
contemporary Turkey’s journey with the EU from the angles of identity and culture. 
 As mentioned earlier, Turkey first demonstrated its will to become a member of 
the EEC (i.e. now the EU) through a signing of an Association Agreement with the EEC 
in 1959. Since this day, “Turkey’s status as a potential member has continuously evoked 
heated debate within the EU and remained at best ambiguous.”228 Drawing from the 
above discussion about Turkey’s being Europe’s other, “an important asymmetry seems 
to be evident concerning its [i.e. Europe] approach to and treatment of insiders and 
outsiders.”229 If one considers the recent enlargement of the CEECs, this reality comes 
to the surface and becomes much more visible. Infact, “it would not be possible to 
explain the differential treatment of the CEECs and Turkey, countries broadly at the 
same level of economic and political development, without reference to this factor.”230 
As already known, the EU did not display the same eagerness and goodwill 
towards Turkey as it did towards the CEECs. At this point, Ziya Onis prefers to point 
out the ambivalent nature of the EU integration process. According to him, European 
project evolves at an ambivalent nature: the EU is a project, 
   “that is sensitive and inclusionary in terms of economic and political 
development to individuals, groups, or nations within what appears to 
be its natural borders defined on civilizational grounds and yet much 
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less sensitive and, indeed, exclusionary in its approach to individuals or 
societies perceived as lying beyond its natural frontiers.”231 
 
What has just been called as ‘ambivalence’ in the rhetoric of Ziya Onis with an 
implicit reference to the EU’s treatment to Turkey is called as hybridity in Bahar 
Rumelili’s terminology. She goes further and argues that “[t]his hybridity produces 
competing discourses on Turkey’s identity in relation to Europe.”232 These competing 
discourses can be summarized as follows:  
   “The discourses that emphasize the exclusive aspect of European 
identity based on geography and culture construct Turkey as inherently 
different. On the other hand, the discourses that emphasize the inclusive 
aspects of European identity construct Turkey as different from Europe 
solely in terms of acquired characteristics.”233  
 
Drawing from her analysis, Rumelili arrives at this conclusion: All these 
discourses highlight that “while exclusion of Turkey is racist and hence incompatible 
with European identity, Turkey is significantly different from Europe because it is 
economically underdeveloped, has an unstable political system marked by pervasive 
military involvement, and a bad human rights.”234  
As these considerations make clear, all debates about Turkish membership to the 
EU are related with Europe’s own confusion and hesitancy about its own identity. 
Debates over Turkish membership are merely the asymmetrical reflections of  ongoing 
debates on European identity, in which ‘mess’ and ‘confusion’ about the shared identity 
among Europeans is no longer possible to hide. 
In sum, almost every scholar-mentioned in this section- has emphasized the legal 
and political aspects of the European identity. The cultural, religious, and civilizational 
dimensions of the debate are assumed to be of secondary importance when the last forty 
years of the EU integration are taken into consideration. This is not to suggest, however, 
that cultural, historical and religious factors have not impacted the construction of the 
EU’s shared identity. Instead, this section is aimed to demonstrate that there are 
different types of European identity; however, as Mayer and Palmowski have argued, 
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“Europe’s most significant political, legal and institutional manifestation…is the 
European Union.”235 In the context of interplay of multitude of identities in the EU, 
from the ideational and cultural perspective, Turkish accession can thus be interpreted 
as such: 
   “[s]ince a European identity is not based on a common historical 
memory, it is difficult to argue that Turkey should be excluded on 
these grounds. As long as Turkey can fulfill the institutional, 
economic and legal requirements for membership, all of which are 
necessary to meet other conditions such as human rights, Turkey is 
not principally excluded from a European identity which has been 
shaped so decisively by the institutions and the law of the EU.”236 
 
Because the question of shared identity of Europe heavily reveals itself in the 
polls made at the societal level; it is thus relevant to discuss the opinion of the EU 
citizens as regards to the prospective Turkish membership to the EU. 
 
 
4.3. Public Opinion: Support for Turkish Accession 
 
 
It is a well- known fact that since the latest enlargement round in May 2004, the 
public opinion in the EU towards further enlargement has changed in a negative 
direction “While 49% of the citizens of the EU are in favor of further enlargement of 
the EU in future years, 39% of the respondents oppose this.”237 Several events have 
contributed to this decline in the popular will vis-à-vis the European integration: (i) 
rejection of the Constitutional Treat by the French and Dutch citizens in 2005; (ii) 
increasing rate of unemployment in several core EU member states; (iii) low rates of 
economic growth in the EU-25. 
When framed as such, economic considerations might seem to affect the public 
attitude towards the accelerated integration. Beyond doubt, “[t]he main thrust of 
European integration has been to sweep away barriers to economic exchange, facilitate 
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mobility of capital and labor, and create a single European monetary authority.”238 
Therefore, it is no coincidence that economic factors play a major role in shaping the 
public opinion of the EU citizens. Looking back at the 2004 enlargement provides the 
simple fact that there were already clear reservations of the EU citizens as regards to the 
entrance of ten new members. The low level of economic development, concentration 
on agricultural sector, and the prospect of immigration to the core EU countries have 
been the characteristics of the state of nature of those states. Summation of all those 
factors has triggered an anxiety among the European public which were already 
suffering from the decline in economic performance in the European economies. All 
these arguments and concerns also hold true for Turkish membership. What is 
significant and determinant in the Turkish case is that fears and concerns of the EU 
citizens over Turkish membership are heavily impacted by the ideational, cultural and 
religious factors. It is thus at this stage that the aforementioned factors seem to 
underestimate the potential contributions of Turkey to the EU. Therefore, examination 
of public opinion in the EU towards Turkish accession- through the aid of the latest 
Eurobarometer polls- is timely and appropriate. 
In both the Special Eurobarometer and Standard Eurobarometer 64 of July 2006, 
there are several questions on Turkey aiming to demonstrate the EU public opinion on 
Turkish membership in depth. 
When the citizens of the EU are asked as regards to their choice of future 
members of the EU; the lowest level of support has been observed for Turkish 
membership to the EU. The question is as follows: “For each of the following countries, 
would you be in favor of against becoming part of the European Union in the future”.239 
Results can be summarized as follows: “The 77 percent of the EU citizens would like to 
see most Switzerland and Norway as future members of the EU. In other words, with 77 
percent of support level coming from the EU citizens, Switzerland and Norway are at 
top of the list of the countries that are most wanted to be seen as future members of the 
EU.”240 On the other hand, with the 31 percent of support level, Turkey has been found 
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to be the least desired country in the list of the EU citizens as to which country they 
would like to see as future member of the EU.241 Having considered the general 
European public attitude towards further enlargement, it is relevant to contemplate over 
questions specific to the question of Turkish membership. To do so, the most recent 
Special Eurobarometer survey results are assumed to provide the most relevant data. 
Here is the most critical question of the latest Special Eurobarometer survey. It is 
critical in the sense that it measures whether or not the citizens of the EU are willing to 
see Turkey as a future member even if Turkey complies all the condition set by the EU. 
The question is as follows: “Once Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the 
European Union, would you be… to the accession of Turkey to the European 
Union?”242 Results of the question are complied in Table 7 given below: 
 
Table 7: Turkey’s Accession Generates Approval or Disapproval? 
 
1. 39% of the respondents are in favor of the Turkish accession while 48% oppose 
this.  
2. The strongest opposition comes from countries like Austria (81%), Germany 
(69%) and Luxembourg (69%) in which public opinion is already less in favor 
of enlargement. 
3. On the other hand, Cyprus (68%) and Greece (67%) are also in disfavor of 
Turkey’s accession although they are generally in favor of accession of other 
countries. 
4. The strongest support comes from the Turkish Cypriot Community (67%). 
Conspicuously, 54% of the Turkish citizens are in favor of their country’s 
accession and 22% of them oppose it. 
Source: Special Eurobarometer 255, pp.70-1. 
 
In this critical juncture, it is worthwhile to mention the positions of some EU 
member states vis-à-vis Turkish membership. However, before going deep down of the 
debate, there are some central points that still demand overall review. Liesbet Hooghe 
and Gary Marks point out the fact that 
   “opposition to European integration is often couched as defense of 
the nation against control form Brussels. Radical right-wing parties in 
France, Denmark, Italy, and Austria tap nationalism to reject further 
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integration, and since 1996 such parties have formed the largest 
reservoir of Euroskepticism in the EU as a whole.”243 
 
This analysis is especially true for the case of Turkey’s EU membership. As has 
already been stated, countries which are less in favor of further integration are also less 
in favor of Turkey’s EU membership. For example, “[T]he German Christian 
Democrats (i.e. Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union) oppose 
Turkish accession together with Austria and several politicians in France, since it would 
‘overstretch’ the EU.”244 Namely, material considerations which are driven by logic of 
consequentiality (e.g. overstretching of the EU) might appear to work in opposition to 
Turkey’s EU memberships. The same logic lead those parties to offer a ‘privileged 
partnership’ to Turkey as opposed to the alternative of full membership. In other words, 
albeit in an implicit manner, historical and cultural differences seem to deteriorate the 
Turkish case. According to Francois Heisbourg of the French Foundation for Strategic 
Research, “[i]t is more or less spoken or more or less hidden, but the major component 
in popular rejection of Turkey’s admission is Islam.”245 Nonetheless, it has also to be 
noted that arguments about Turkey’s cultural fit to Europe does not all come from the 
far-right political parties of Europe. For example, when former French Prime Minister 
Jean Marie Raffarin was asked in 2004 so as to comment about Turkish membership, he 
made the following remarks: “We are not doubting the good faith of Mr. Erdogan, but 
to what extent can today or tomorrow’s government make Turkish society embrace 
Europe’s human rights values? Do we want the river of Islam to enter the riverbed of 
secularism?”246  
Although the overall picture might appear to give negative signals about the issue 
of Turkey’s cultural fit to Europe; there are however some positive arguments which 
prove that Turkish accession is still an attainable goal. Former German Prime Minister 
Joscka Fischer, once claiming himself to carry doubts about Turkish membership; has 
given the following statements after the ‘War on Terrorism”: 
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   “to modernize an Islamic country based on the shared values of 
Europe would almost be a D-Day for Europe in the war against terror, 
[because it] would provide real proof that Islam and modernity, Islam 
and the rule of law…[and] this great cultural tradition and human 
rights are after all compatible.”247  
  
To end the discussion on the public opinion about Turkish accession, nine 
statements, in which the EU public opinion as regards to Turkish membership are 
crystallized, are assumed to give valuable insights in this matter. Nine statements are 
produced from the answers given the subsequent question: “For each of the following 
please tell me you agree-% EU”248. Results are complied in Table 8 given below: 
 
Table 8: Turkish Membership in the Eyes of the EU Citizens 
1. “To join the EU in about 10 years, Turkey will have to respect systematically 
Human Rights”: 83 % agree and 7% disagree. 
2. “To join the EU in about ten years, Turkey will have to significantly improve the 
state of its economy”: 76 % agree and 10% disagree. 
3. “Turkey’s joining could risk favoring immigration to more developed countries 
in the EU”: 63 % agree and 23% disagree. 
4. “The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member States are too 
significant to allow for this accession”: 55 % agree and 31% disagree. 
5. “Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography”: 54% agree and 35% 
disagree. 
6. “Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history”: 40% agree and 45% disagree. 
7. “Turkey’s accession to the EU would favor the mutual comprehension of 
European and Muslim values”: 38 % agree and 47 % disagree. 
8. “Turkey’s accession to the EU would strengthen the security in this region”: 
35% agree and 48% disagree. 
9. “Turkey’s accession would favor the rejuvenation of an ageing European 
population”: 29% agree and 50% disagree. 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 64, p. 139. 
 
In view of the nine statements presented above, it is possible to argue that in the 
eyes of the EU public ‘Turkey’s accession should be contingent on the fulfillment of 
certain conditions’: the systematic respect for human rights (83%) and the significant 
improvement in the state of Turkish economy (76%). In other words, as Hooghe and 
Marks have previously pointed out both the identity (in the form of cultural traits, and 
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religion) and economic rationality impact the public opinion on further EU 
enlargement.249 Regarding the Turkish case, as the numbers clearly reveal, both the 
logic of consequentiality (implying to economic rationality) and the logic of 
appropriateness (referring to the shared identity, norms, values of the EU) appear to go 
hand in hand. 
With respect to country profiles, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Greece and Luxembourg are the countries in which there is 
already a tacit agreement on the view that Turkey will have to respect Human Rights in 
the following ten years. More than 9 out of ten respondents in those countries 
apparently adhere to this view. As for the case of Turkey itself, 69% of the Turkish 
respondents are in agreement that Turkey will have to demonstrate a systematic respect 
for human rights.250 
As for the issue of economic improvement, there is almost unanimity among the 
respondents, 76% are in agreement with the view that Turkey will have to significantly 
improve the state of its economy. It is worth to remind that varying degrees of 
agreement among the countries seem to be arising from the ‘don’t know’ responses 
which are tantamount to 14%. The highest level of agreement in this matter can be 
observed in Greece (92%), Finland (91%) and Belgium (90%).251 
In reference to the discussion on further enlargement and the prospect of Turkish 
membership, the citizens of the Union in the final analysis are found to be displaying 
certain characteristics. See the following lines at the end of the Special Eurobarometer 
2006; 
   “Europeans surveyed recognize that EU enlargement will have 
positive consequences on mobility for Europe, the enrichment of 
cultural diversity, peace and stability, democracy, as well as the 
reinforcement of the EU’s role on the international scene. In contrast, 
with regard to the economic and social consequences of the process, 
EU citizens worry most about employment. They fear an increase in 
labor transfer to countries where labor is cheaper, as well as expecting 
workers from future member states of the Union to settle in other EU 
countries…for future enlargement processes; apart from the low level 
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of knowledge about the topic in general, benefits for the EU are less 








Obviously, Turkey’s membership is not guaranteed. Turkey still has a lot to do on 
its way to the EU. Turkey’s poor economic and political credentials are the main 
obstacles in front of Turkish accession to the EU. Turkey still needs further 
democratization in the political realm and the state of sustainable growth pattern in the 
economic realm. Stability and sustainability in both realms are assumed to help Turkey 
find its place in the international arena. It is no surprise that Turkish state needs to get 
into a profound and radical process of transformation in order to meet the EU demands 
throughout the entire accession process. Nonetheless, many commentators do not give 
up pointing out the ‘differences’ of Turkey in every occasion without taking into 
consideration the final stage arrived in Turkey-EU relations. Discussions on Turkey’s 
not belonging to the European family or hints on its Islamism are not essential barriers 
in front of the Turkish membership. “To assert that Turkey cannot be a member of the 
EU because of its culture and, especially, because it is Muslim, would be …an intrinsic 
and insurmountable incompatibility with democratic values and respect for human 
rights”.253 Such claims on Turkish membership are mere reflections of Europe’s own 
confusion, disorientation about its own identity. 254 In other words, challenge is two-
sided: one lies at the heart of the EU’s itself. That it is to say, prospect of Turkish 
membership will not only determine the future of Turkey but also that of the Europe’s. 
Turkish identity and European identity are subject to change in accordance with the 
circumstances dictated by the nature of the relationship. The second challenge stands at 
the core of Turkish state in view of the fact that Turkey still needs to better its 
economic, societal and political conditions. Namely, , “the realization of the EU dream 
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and, in part at least, its pursuit, require a process of transvaluation whereby the 
normative core of political activity and institutions in Turkey faces the need not simply 
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Eastern enlargement of the European Union should both be discussed through the 
lenses of the rational institutionalism and the sociological/constructivist institutionalism. 
However, what is at stake here is that “rationalism and constructivism do not provide us 
with fully elaborated and internally consistent competing hypotheses on enlargement 
that we could rigorously test against each other.”256 Therefore it is wise to perceive 
rationalist and sociological/constructivist theories of institutions “as partially competing 
and partially complementary sources of theoretical inspiration for the study of 
enlargement.” 257 
When looked into the fundamentals of these two institutionalisms, it is possible to 
observe that they are based on different social ontologies (individualism and 
materialism in rationalism and ideational ontology in constructivism) and assume 
different logics of action-a rationalist logic of consequentiality opposed to constructivist 
logic of appropriateness.258  
It is possible to see a group of utility-driven actors in the rational institutionalism, 
bargaining for their own national interests in the issues concerning the enlargement 
policy. The primary consideration is the relative weight of costs vis-à-vis the benefits 
for each individual country in matters of enlargement. Since the social players act as 
utility-maximizers (i.e. doing what is most beneficial for their own national interests) 
these players are expected to make use of strategic bargaining and negotiations among 
them. In other words, logic of consequentiality is the driving force behind the entire 
enlargement process. 
As for sociological/constructivist institutionalism, social players are supposed to 
follow the logic of appropriateness through the guidance of norm/principle 
entrepreneurs like the European Commission. Decisions on enlargement policy thus are 
supposed to be taken in accordance with the constitutive norms, principles and the 
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shared identity of the Union. In other words, logic of appropriateness governs the entire 
enlargement policy and the subsequent process. 
What is striking for the confines of this thesis is that the possibility of 
reconciliation of these approaches. As Torreblanca has pointed out very clearly, 
throughout the whole Eastern enlargement a middle-ground has been found to 
accommodate interests and principles in the EU.259 In other words, EU enlargement 
policy has found a middle ground to move in a normative direction (hence meeting the 
EU’s constitutive norms and principles) and, in the mean time, let member states to 
protect and maximize their material interests. 
Having discussed all the aspects of theorizing EU enlargement with respect to the 
Eastern expansion, it is relevant to extend the debate into Turkey’s accession to the EU. 
When Turkey first signed the Association Agreement with the then the European 
Economic Community in 1959, “the EEC was an economic organization and the 
political integration that we see today existed only in the dreams of the most ambitious 
architects of the European project.”260 In those times, the logic of consequentiality was 
largely dominating the European project.  
As the Community itself started growing in number, the logic of appropriateness 
started to reveal itself as the new ‘driving engine’ of the European project. Respectively, 
inclusion of Greece, Spain and Portugal into the Community throughout the 80s paved 
the way for the prospect of political integration in which, thus, logic of appropriateness 
began to grow stronger vis-à-vis the logic of consequentiality. In particular, by means of 
deep integration process which was commenced right after the Maastricht Treaty of 
1991, today’s European Union began to be shaped. Political and legal aspects came to 
the fore front in the integration project together with the material considerations. This 
new structuring of the EU has inevitably impacted the course of Turkey-EU relations. 
In many occasions, ‘Turkey’s shortcomings in its democracy, and poor human 
right records’ were reiterated by European political elites. Prior to the December 2004, 
the main concern of the EU was about the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria by the 
Turkish government. “There was little need to refer to historical/cultural/religious 
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arguments about whether Turkey could ever be ‘European’; it was enough to note that 
on strictly political grounds, Turkey was not yet ‘European’ enough.”261  
As a matter of fact, with the opening the accession talks, Europeans bitterly felt 
the necessity of “rethinking about the parameters of the European project or the identity 
or purpose of the European Union.”262. It is at this stage historical, religious and 
ideational arguments in front of the Turkish accession to the EU undermine the material 
benefits with regard to the Turkish case. Put differently, both the logic of 
consequentiality and logic of appropriateness have explanatory power in elucidating the 
Turkish case. That is to say, both the rational institutionalism and 
sociological/constructivist institutionalism have their say in conjunction with Turkey’s 
accession. 
For such a long time, Turkey has been (and for some others.. is still) viewed as 
Europe’s other. Historical, religious and cultural traits are the ones which make the 
Turkish case worse in the eyes of European public. When framed as such, constructivist 
claims such as sharing the common understanding of the past, traits, constitutive values 
and principles of the Community appear to have proven futile in the Turkish case. Since 
Turkey is not completely assumed to share the civilizational dimension of European 
project; sociological/constructivist institutionalism fails short of in giving a full answer 
to the question of Turkish accession to the EU. Therefore, kin-ship based (i.e. referring 
to Sjursen’s view) and norm-based (i.e. referring to Schimmelfennig’s view) arguments 
are hard to find for Turkish membership. 
When one considers the worsening impacts of the cultural and ideational factors 
in case of Turkey, the already existent potential benefits of Turkish membership appear 
to be underestimated. In other words, it is not the instrumental logic that leads the 
integration project. Since, impacts of the cultural and ideational factors for the case of 
Turkey heavily reveal themselves at the societal level; the pace of Turkish accession to 
the EU might badly be affected from this situation. Drawing from the arguments above, 
it is thus possible to argue that rational institutionalism has shortcomings of its own in 
explaining the Turkish case. 
In sum, Turkey’s accession to the EU are to be determined by its material costs 
and benefits; however, the perceptions of these costs and benefits will largely be 
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determined by the willingness of the European public to accept Turkey. Culture and 
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